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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST AFFORD L. SMITH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim ) 
Defendant/Respondent ) 
v. ) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1434 
Docket No. 42621 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, ) 
) 
Defendant and Counterclaim ) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant. ) 
) 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, ) 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) 
) 
V. 
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and 
STAFFWOOD ~ARTNERSHIP, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants 
Respondent. 
************** 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
iv_u,..,11a1., D. Mayfield 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorney for Appellant 
Kara L. Pettit 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Seve dicial District Court .. Bonneville Co User: PADILLA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
Stafford Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. , Staffwood 
Date Code User Judge 
3/7/2014 NGOC CARTER New Case Filed-Other Claims Jon J. Shindurling 
NOAP CARTER Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Kara L Pettit 
CARTER Filing: A -All initial civil case filings of any type not Jon J. Shindurling 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Pettit, Kara L (attorney for Smith, 
Stafford L) Receipt number: 0010878 Dated: 
3/7/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Cash) For: Smith, 
Stafford L {plaintiff) 
COMP CARTER Complaint (Filed Under Seal) Jon J. Shindurling 
Document sealed 
MOTN CARTER Plaintiff- Ex Parte Motion To Seal Complaint Jon J. Shindurling 
3/10/2014 ORDR LYKE Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal Jon J. Shindurling 
Complaint 
3/12/2014 SMIS CARTER Summons Issued Jon J. Shindurling 
3/14/2014 MOTN HUMPHREY Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion To Seal Amended Jon J. Shindurling 
Complaint 
3/17/2014 ORDR LYKE Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal Jon J. Shindurling 
Complaint 
COMP LYKE Amended Complaint Filed Jon J. Shindurling 
Document sealed 
3/21/2014 CARTER Acceptance Of Service 03/14/2014 Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael W. Spence and Greggory J Savage 
(attorneys) For Woodruff D. Smith 
3/24/2014 MOTN HUMPHREY Motion For Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael R. Carlston 
MOTN HUMPHREY Motion For Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Stanley J. Preston 
3/27/2014 MOTN CARTER Plaintiff - (2) Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission Jon J. Shindurling 
3/28/2014 ORDR LYKE Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Stanley J. Preston 
NOAP LYKE Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Stanley J. Preston 
4/2/2014 ORDR LYKE Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael R. Carlston 
NOAP LYKE Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael R Carlston 
4/8/2014 ORDR LYKE Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael W. Spence 
ORDR LYKE Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling 
Greggory J. Savage 
NOAP LYKE Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael W. Spence 
NOAP LYKE Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Jon 
J. 
1 
Date: 3/31/2015 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
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dicial District Court - Bonneville Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
User: PADILLA 
Stafford vs. Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. 
Date 
4/14/2014 
4/21/2014 
4/28/2014 
5/16/2014 
Code 
NOAP 
MOTN 
MEMO 
ANSW 
HRSC 
NOTH 
ANSW 
NOAP 
User 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
LYKE 
HUMPHREY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
Judge 
Defendant: Smith, Woodruff Notice Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Appearance Michael D Mayfield 
Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Mayfield, Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael D (attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt 
number: 0017064 Dated: 4/15/2014 Amount: 
$3.00 (Credit card) For: Smith, Woodruff 
(defendant) 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Jon J. Shindurling 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Mayfield, 
Michael D (attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt 
number: 0017064 Dated: 4/15/2014 Amount: 
$66.00 (Credit card) For: Smith, Woodruff 
(defendant) 
Filing: K3 - Third party complaint - This fee is in Jon J. Shindurling 
addition to any fee filed as a plaintiff initiating the 
case or as a defendant appearing in the case. 
Paid by: Mayfield, Michael D (attorney for Smith, 
Woodruff) Receipt number: 0017068 Dated: 
4/15/2014 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: Smith, 
Woodruff (defendant) 
Filing: K4 - Cross Claim (defendant v defendant Jon J. Shindurling 
or plaintiff v. plaintiff) This fee is in addition to any 
fee filed as a plaintiff to initiate the case or as a 
defendant appearing in the case Paid by: 
Mayfield, Michael D (attorney for Smith, 
Woodruff) Receipt number: 0017068 Dated: 
4/15/2014 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: Smith, 
Woodruff (defendant) 
Third-Party Plaintiff - Motion To Dismiss Or In The Jon J. Shindurling 
Alternative Motion For Summary Judgment 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Jon J. Shindurling 
Or In The Alternative Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Answer, Counterclaim And Third Party Complaint Jon J. Shindurling 
(With Jury Demand) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/02/2014 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Motion to Stay/Motion for Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing - 06/02/2014@ 9:30AM Jon J. Shindurling 
DefendanUCounterclaimant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss Or In The 
Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment 
Stafford Smith Reply To Counterclaim And Smith Jon J. Shindur!ing 
Chevrolet Answer To Third-Party Complaint 
Defendant: Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. Notice Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Appearance Michael R Carlston 
Date: 3/31/2015 
Time: 01.35 PM 
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Seve dicial District Court - Bonneville Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
User: PADILLA 
Stafford Smith vs. Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. Staffwood 
Date Code User 
5/16/2014 CEARLY 
CEARLY 
5/21/2014 MOTN CEARLY 
MEMO CEARLY 
NOTH CEARLY 
5/27/2014 MEMO CARTER 
CARTER 
5/30/2014 MEMO QUINTANA 
6/2/2014 MEMO LYKE 
MINE LYKE 
Judge 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Jon J. Shindurling 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Carlston, 
Michael R (attorney for Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.) 
Receipt number: 0022976 Dated: 5/20/2014 
Amount: $66.00 (Credit card) For: Smith 
Chevrolet Co. Inc. (defendant) 
Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Carlston, Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael R (attorney for Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.) 
Receipt number: 0022976 Dated: 5/20/2014 
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Smith Chevrolet 
Co. Inc. (defendant) 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/Third-Party 
Defendant - Motion For Judgment On The 
Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And Smith 
Chevrolet 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
On The Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And 
Smith Chevrolet 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Judgment On Jon J. Shindurling 
The Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And Smith 
Chevrolet 06-02-14 @ 9:30 AM 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants Motion To Dismiss Or In The 
Alternative Motion For Summary Judgment 
Defendant - Opposition TO Stafford Smith And Jon J. Shindurling 
Smith Chevrolets Motion For Judgment On The 
Pleadings 
Defendant - Reply Memorandum in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment o the Pleadings Filed by Stafford Smith 
and Smith Chevrolet 
Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 6/2/2014 
Time: 10:49 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Mary Fox 
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke 
Tape Number: 
Party: Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc., Attorney: Michael 
Carlston 
Party: Stafford Smith, Attorney: Kara Pettit 
Party: Staffwood Partnership 
Party: Woodruff Smith, Attorney: Michael Mayfield 
Date: 3/31/2015 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
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Seve dicial District Court - Bonneville Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
User: PADILLA 
Stafford Smith Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. Staffwood 
Date 
6/2/2014 
6/23/2014 
7/28/2014 
8/20/2014 
8/21/2014 
8/28/2014 
9/3/2014 
10/1/2014 
Code 
DCHH 
MEMO 
MRUD 
ORDR 
JDMT 
STATUS 
CDIS 
HRSC 
STATUS 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
NOTH 
AFFD 
NOTC 
User 
LYKE 
HUMPHREY 
HUMPHREY 
LYKE 
LYKE 
LYKE 
LYKE 
QUINTANA 
LYKE 
LYKE 
BIRCH 
BIRCH 
BIRCH 
BIRCH 
BIRCH 
CARTER 
CARTER 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
06/02/2014 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Mary Fox 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Pit's Motion for Judgment on 
Pleadings; Def. Motion to Dismiss Under 150 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant And Third-Party Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Filed By 
Stafford Smith And Smith Chevrolet 
Mail Returned Unable to Deliver - Stanley J. Jon J. Shindurling 
Preston Resent 
Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or in the Alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
Case Status Changed: Closed Jon J. Shindurling 
Civil Disposition entered for: Smith Chevrolet Co. Jon J. Shindurling 
Inc., Defendant; Smith, Woodruff, Defendant; 
Staffwood Partnership, Defendant; Smith, 
Stafford L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 8/20/2014 
Objections to Proposed Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2014 10:00 
AM) Mtn for Attorney Fees 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Attorneys' Fees And Costs (fax) 
Affidavit Of Stanley J. Preston In Support Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees And Costs 
(fax) 
Notice Of Hearing - October 20, 2014@ 10AM Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
Affidavit Of Michael R. Carlston In Support Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs 
(fax) 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shinduiling 
Supreme Court Paid by: Mayfield, Michael D 
(attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt number: 
0044696 Dated: 10/2/2014 Amount: $129.00 
(Check) For: Smith, Woodruff (defendant) 
Defendant (Woofruff D. Smith) - Notice Of Appeal Jon J. 
Date: 3/31/2015 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
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Seve udicial District Court - Bonneville Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
User: PADILLA 
Stafford Smith vs. Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. 
Date 
10/1/2014 
10/10/2014 
10/14/2014 
10/15/2014 
10/16/2014 
10/17/2014 
10/23/2014 
10/27/2014 
12/1/2014 
12/10/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/23/2014 
Code 
APSC 
NOTC 
CONT 
HRSC 
BNDC 
BNDC 
CERTAP 
APSC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MEMO 
MINE 
DCHH 
DEOP 
NOTC 
User 
CARTER 
BIRCH 
LYKE 
LYKE 
LYKE 
BIRCH 
CARTER 
PADILLA 
PADILLA 
PADILLA 
PADILLA 
LYKE 
CARTER 
HUMPHREY 
LYKE 
LYKE 
ANDERSEN 
HUMPHREY 
CARTER 
CARTER 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice Of Change Of Address - Stanley J. 
Preston, counsel for Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
10/20/2014 10:00 AM: Continued Mtn for 
Attorney Fees 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/27/2014 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Attorney 
Notice of Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Attorneys' Jon J. Shindurling 
Fees And Costs 
Plaintiff - Request For Additional Transcript 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 47005 Dated 
10/16/2014 for 200.00) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 47007 Dated 
10/16/2014 for 100.00) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Motion to Appear Telephonically at Hearing 
scheduled for October 27, 2014 
Plaintiffs Motion To Appear Telephonically At 
Hearing Scheduled For October 27, 2014 
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's 
Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 10/27/2014 
Time: 10:30 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Mary Fox 
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke 
Tape Number: 
Party: Stafford Smith, Attorney: Kara Pettit 
Party: Woodruff Smith, Attorney: Michael Mayfield 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
10/27/2014 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Mary Fox 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Mtn for Attorney Fees 
Stan Preston #801-869-1623 Under 50 
Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Attorney's Fees 
Amended Notice Of Appeal Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff - Request For Additional Transcript Jon J. Shindurling 
Receipt For Payment Of Jon J. 
Date: 3/31/2015 
Time: PM 
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Seve dicial District Court - Bonneville Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001434-0C Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal. 
User: PADILLA 
Stafford vs. Woodruff Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc., 
Date 
1/23/2015 
1/27/2015 
1/29/2015 
2/2/2015 
3/23/2015 
3/24/2015 
3/25/2015 
3/31/2015 
Code 
JDMT 
CDIS 
AFFD 
WRIT 
BNDC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
BNDC 
User 
CARTER 
CARTER 
LYKE 
LYKE 
JNICHOLS 
JNICHOLS 
JNICHOLS 
QUINTANA 
JNICHOLS 
QUINTANA 
PADILLA 
Judge 
***WRIT AND $2 CASH RETURNED, PER Jon J. Shindurling 
JUDGES CLERK, JUDGMENT PAPERWORK 
NEEDS SUBMITTED SO THAT A JUDGMENT 
CAN BE ENTERED BEFORE ISSUING A 
WRIT*** 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Jon J. Shindurling 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Justin Seamons Receipt number: 0003884 
Dated: 1/28/2015 Amount: $1.00 (Cash) 
Judgment $79,262.18 Jon J. Shindurling 
Civil Disposition entered for: Smith Chevrolet Co. Jon J. Shindurling 
Inc., Defendant; Smith, Woodruff, Defendant; 
Staffwood Partnership, Defendant; Smith, 
Stafford L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/29/2015 
Affidavit Of Amount Due Under Judgment 
Writ OF Execution Issued Bonneville County 
$79,963.37 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Jon J. Shindurling 
by: Justin R. Seamons Receipt number: 0004884 
Dated: 2/3/2015 Amount $2.00 (Cash) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 12910 Dated Jon J. Shindurling 
3/23/2015 for 71383.52) 
Motion To Stary Enforcement Of Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Enforcement of 
Judgment 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14013 Dated Jon J. Shindurling 
3/31/2015 for 509.73) 
Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276) 
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, ST ATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
(Filed Under Seal) 
Civil No.: 
Judge: 
Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith ("Plaintiff') hereby complains against Defendant WoodruffD. 
Smith ("Defendant") as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
3. Plaintiff, through an Idaho limited liability partnership known as The SLS l, LLP 
(formerly known as The SLS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership), is a fifty 
percent (50%) owner of Staff\vood Partnership, an Idaho general partnership ("Staff\vood"). 
4. Defendant, through an Idaho limited partnership known as The WDS Limited 
Partnership is a fifty percent (50%) owner of Staffwood. 
5. Staff\vood is the owner of various properties that are the subject of this case, and 
all of these properties are located in Bonneville County, Idaho, with the exception of one 
property which is located in Bingham County, Idaho. 
6. Plaintiff and Defendant are brothers. 
7. Many of the acts and omissions at issue in this Complaint took place in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Plaintiff resides in Bonneville County, Idaho. Staff\vood's principal 
place of business is located in Bonneville County, Idaho. In addition, this case involves real 
estate and other property located in Bonneville and Bingham Counties, Idaho. Jurisdiction and 
venue are therefore proper in this Court. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Over the years, Plaintiff and Defendant have had various business relationships. 
In approximately 2010, disputes arose between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the respective 
ownership interest each party had in certain businesses, and the manner in which the businesses 
have been managed. Based on these disputes, Plaintiff and Defendant asserted and alleged 
various legal claims against each other. 
9. In an effort to resolve their disputes and differences with each other, and to 
separate ownership of the car dealerships and other businesses they had jointly owned, Plaintiff 
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and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement, effective November 10, 2010 (the "2010 
Settlement Agreement"), whereby ownership of the various car dealerships and certain other 
businesses in which Plaintiff and Defendant had joint ownership were divided between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. 
l 0. As part of the 20 IO Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of 
themselves and their various business entities entered into mutual releases of all claims. 
11. The closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement took place on or about 
February l 0, 2011. 
12. Subsequent to the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, a lawsuit was 
filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, entitled 
Woodrujf D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case No. CV-11-1772 (the 
"Lawsuit"), wherein Plaintiff and Defendant asserted various claims and counterclaims 
against each other arising under the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise. 
13. During the course of discovery related to the Lawsuit, the parties detennined 
that there were additional disputes between them that were not addressed in the Lawsuit. 
14. Ultimately, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a second Settlement Agreement, 
effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 Settlement Agreement"), whereby Plaintiff and Defendant 
settled all additional claims and disputes between themselves and their various business entities 
that were asserted in the Lawsuit, and that they had otherwise discovered. 
15. As part of the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of 
themselves and their various business entities entered into mutual releases of all claims, and the 
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Lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. 
16. At all relevant times hereto, Michael Spence and Greggory Savage of the law firm 
of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. (collectively "RQN") have served as Defendant's attorneys. 
Among other things, RQN represented Defendant and his business entities in the disputes that 
led up to the 2010 Settlement Agreement, in the negotiation and finalization of the 2010 
Settlement Agreement, in the Lawsuit and related disputes thereto, and in the negotiation and 
finalization of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. 
17. At all times relevant hereto, RQN have held themselves out as the attorneys for 
Defendant, with full authority to negotiate and enter into agreements on behalf of Defendant and 
his business entities. In fact, RQN has routinely and repeatedly asserted that it represents 
Defendant in the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant over the past several years, as well as 
in the disputes, negotiations, written communications and agreements that give 1ise to this case. 
18. Under the tern1s of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant 
agreed on terms regarding the management of Staffwood, in which they each continued to have a 
fifty percent (50%) ownership interest. These terms included a provision whereby Plaintiff and 
Defendant agreed to appoint a mutually acceptable third member to the Board of Staffwood for 
the purpose of breaking any deadlock between Plaintiff and Defendant as the other two members 
of Staffwood' s Board. In accordance with the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff 
and Defendant jointly agreed to appoint this third Board member. 
19. Under the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, as amended by the 2012 
Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant also agreed to a procedure whereby the parties 
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had the right to initiate a bid process for the purpose of purchasing real property owned by 
Staffwood. 
20. In early 2013, Plaintiff initiated this bid process by making a bid to purchase three 
properties owned by Staffwood: (1) the building and related real property (the "Smith Chevrolet 
Property") leased and occupied by the Smith Chevrolet dealership ("Smith Chevrolet") owned by 
Plaintiff; (2) the building and related real property (the "RV Property") leased by Smith 
Chevrolet, and occupied by an RV dealership owned by Plaintiff; and (3) a certain building and 
related real property (the "Outlet Property") leased by Smith Chevrolet. The Smith Chevrolet 
Property, the RV Property and the Outlet Property are collectively referred to herein as the "Bid 
Properties." 
21. Staffwood had previously obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank (the "WFB 
Loan"), which was secured by the Bid Properties. Smith Chevrolet advanced funds on behalf of 
Staffwood substantially in excess of Smith Chevrolet's obligations for leasing the Bid Properties, 
for the purpose of ensuring that Staffwood had adequate funds to pay its ongoing obligations, 
which included, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs 
and servicing the WFB Loan. 
22. Under the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Staffwood agreed to reimburse Smith 
Chevrolet for amounts it paid on behalf of Staffwood to make the payments on the WFB Loan, 
and to meet the other obligations identified in the previous paragraph, to the extent these funds 
exceeded the amount Smith Chevrolet was obligated to pay Staffwood for Smith Chevrolet's 
iease of the Bid Properties. 
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By the end of 2013, Defendant's share of the amounts owed to Smith Chevrolet 
for the funds it had advanced on behalf of Staffwood exceeded $350,000. Defendant has never 
paid his share of this obligation. 
24. By the end of 2013, the outstanding principal balance owed by Staffwood on the 
WFB Loan exceeded $850,000.00. 
25. In response to Plaintiff's bid to purchase the Bid Properties, Defendant submitted 
his own bid for the Bid Properties, and the parties traded bids for the Bid Prope1iies for several 
months. 
26. After Defendant made the final bid for the Bid Properties, he then improperly 
asserted that he was unwilling to purchase the Bid Properties unless Plaintiff and Staffwood 
agreed to satisfy and meet certain unjustified and unreasonable demands and conditions related 
to the Bid Properties, which Plaintiff was unwilling to do. This resulted in a new dispute 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
27. During the back and forth between Plaintiff and Defendant, the third board 
member of Staffwood resigned in response to frivolous and unsupported threats and accusations 
made by Defendant and/or Defendant's agents. As a result, Staffwood was paralyzed to take 
any action where Plaintiff and Defendant were not both in agreement. 
28. In an effort to negotiate a resolution of this dispute, a series of meetings and 
communications took place between RQN as Defendant's attorneys and Plaintiff's attorneys. 
29. Plaintiff's attorneys subsequently sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to 
Defendant's attorneys, RQN, (the "December 20 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
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whereby Plaintiff offered to purchase the Bid Properties based on the following 
material terms: 
a. Plaintiff would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and 
b. The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be divided 
between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the amounts Staffwood 
owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds it had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of 
Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations, as alleged above. See Exhibit A. 
30. In response, RQN sent Plaintiff's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the 
"January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, wherein RQN, as 
Defendant's attorneys, expressly stated, "Woody hereby accepts [Plaintiff's J offer as set forth in 
your letter of December 20, 2013." Exhibit B. Significantly, Defendant and his accountant, Hal 
Bennett were copied on the January 13 Letter. 
31. In the January 13 Letter, Defendant also expressly stated the following regarding 
his understanding of the two material tern1s offered by Plaintiff in the December 20 Letter 
regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties: 
a. "[Plaintiff] closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million." Exhibit B; and 
b. "All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and 
shall be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of [the WFB Loan] (assumed to be about 
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and other 
expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds shall be 
distributed equally to the partners." Exhibit B. 
7 
32. In the January 13 Letter, Defendant proposed, 
" .. that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done 
on a tax free basis. [Defendant's] accountants believe that by treating the entire 
transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interest in Staffwood, the 
parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax 
consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this 
provision is outside of the terms of [Plaintiff's] offer, we make clear that we do 
not require [Plaintiff's] agreement to [this proposal]. 
Exhibit B ( emphasis added). 
33. In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, RQN again urged Plaintiff to acquire the Bid 
Properties as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal that the 
parties had agreed to, and stated, "[ w ]e realize that [Plaintiff] has the right to treat this as a sale 
and exchange of the [Bid Properties] .... " Exhibit C. 
34. While there was some additional back and forth on some other non-material 
terms, regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between 
the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance 
regarding the material terms for Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties. 
35. Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for 
Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties, which agreement is hereafter referred to as the "Bid 
Properties Purchase Agreement." 
36. In addition to accepting Plaintiffs offer to purchase the Bid Properties in the 
January 13 Letter, Defendant also made an offer regarding the division of the remaining real 
property owned by Staffwood. See Exhibit B. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that 
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"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ... 
[and Plaintiff] shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B, and [Defendant] 
shall receive the Property Set not elected by [Plaintiff]." Id. 
37. Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River 
Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Property 
Set B consisted of the Bellin Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the recent 
sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient. See id. 
38. In response to Defendant's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on 
the terms set forth in the January 13 Letter, Plaintiffs attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated 
January 30, 2014 (the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D, 
which stated, "[Plaintiff] is pleased that [Defendant] has accepted [Plaintiffs] settlement offer 
based on the tenns communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that 
[Plaintiff] is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms 
outlined in [the January 13 Letter], and [Plaintiff] has decided to choose Property Set B." 
39. Again, while there was some back and forth on other non-material terms, 
regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between the 
attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance 
regarding the material terms for the division of Staffwood's remaining real property between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
40. Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for 
dividing between themselves the remaining reai property owned by Staffwood, which contract is 
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hereafter referred to as the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement." 
41. In reliance on Defendant's representations and promises, Plaintiff communicated 
to Defendant that he ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions agreed to 
under both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood Properties 
Agreement ( coilectively, the "Agreements"), and convey the properties in accordance with the 
terms of the Agreements. See February 20, 2014 Email from Stanley J. Preston to RQN and 
attached documents, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
42. In response, Defendant has tried to insert new and unrelated demands that were 
never part of the Agreements. Finally, Plaintiff sent a fom1al demand to Defendant to comply 
with the Agreements and to close the transactions agreed to under the Agreements. See March 3, 
2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
43. At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been ready, willing, able and fully prepared to 
close on the Agreements and satisfy his contractual obligations under the Agreements. 
44. Defendant has failed and refused to proceed with the required closing of the 
Agreements, in accordance with the tem1s of the Agreements. 
45. Defendant has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any 
enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and 
acceptances between the parties as set forth above. 
46. Specifically, Defendant is now asserting that the reason the Agreements are not 
binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Defendant's 
insistence that the entire transaction be treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood 
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properties. Defendant's position, however, is directly rebutted by the express written statements 
made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email. 
47. The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division 
of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Properties would be a distribution, 
Defendant expressly agreed that Plaintiff had the right to purchase the Bid Properties. 
48. In the meantime, Plaintiff has now been required to pay-off the WFB Loan on 
Staffwood's behalf with Plaintiff's own funds. The amount required to pay-off the WFB Loan 
totaled $858,066, half of which amount Defendant is required to pay. 
49. Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant, as a 50% owner of Staffwood, to pay 
Defendant's share of funds required to pay-off the WFB Loan, which amounts to $429,033. 
Defendant has to date failed and refused to pay this sum to Plaintiff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement) 
50. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
51. The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable 
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
52. Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential 
tenns of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, which tenns are sufficiently clear and certain to 
enable the parties to specifically perfonn the tenns of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
53. The terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement are reasonable and based on 
adequate consideration. 
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54. Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of 
Plaintiff under the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and all conditions precedent that Plaintiff 
agreed to perform pursuant to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement have been satisfied. 
55. Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is fully prepared, to pay the full 
consideration called for in the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and continues to be ready, 
willing and able both to pay the required consideration, and to close the real estate transactions, 
required by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
56. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the 
required closing pursuant to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, or to convey 
the Bid Properties to Plaintiff. 
57. Defendant has breached the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by engaging in 
the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his obligations 
under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement. 
58. The real property that Plaintiff agreed to purchase under the Bid Properties 
Purchase Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has no 
adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, 
other than specific performance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
59. Plaintiff is entitled to specific perfonnance of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among other 
things, to complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the 
12 
1 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
60. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential, 
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's 
breaches of the Bid Properties Agreement, ali in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
61. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement) 
62. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
63. The Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitutes a valid and 
enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
64. Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential 
tenns of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and 
certain to enable the parties to specifically perfonn the tenns of the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement. 
65. The terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement are reasonable and 
based on adequate consideration. 
66. Plaintiff has performed all promises and material obligations required of 
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Plaintiff under the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, and all conditions precedent that 
Plaintiff agreed to perform pursuant to the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement have 
been satisfied. 
67. Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is willing, able, ready and fully 
prepared to dose the reai estate transactions, required by the Division of Staffwood Properties 
Agreement. 
68. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the 
required closing pursuant to the terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, or to 
divide the subject properties and convey them in accordance with the terms of the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement. 
69. Defendant has breached the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by 
engaging in the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his 
obligations under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement. 
70. The real property that Plaintiff is entitled to receive under the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and 
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement, other than specific performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties 
Agreement. 
71. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among 
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other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in accordance with the terms of, 
and perform his other obligations under, the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement. 
72. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, 
consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of 
Defendant's breaches of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be 
determined at trial, which amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
73. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be detem1ined at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Regarding the Agreements) 
74. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
75. Under Idaho law, and inherent in both of the Agreements, are implied covenants 
of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to every 
aspect of these contractual relationships between Plaintiff and Defendant. These covenants of 
good faith and fair dealing prohibit Defendant from intentionally or purposefully doing anything 
which would impair, destroy or injure Plaintiff's right to receive the fruits of the A,greements and 
the ordinary and reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the Agreements. 
76. To comply with these covenants, Defendant had an obligation to act consistently 
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with the Agreements' agreed common purposes and Plaintiff's justified and reasonable 
expectations. 
77. Defendant has breached his covenants of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff 
by engaging in the conduct set forth above. 
78. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of his covenants of good faith 
and fair dealing, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential, 
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches 
of his covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
79. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate pennitted by law, all in an amount to be detennined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
80. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
81. RQN, with the full authorization of Defendant and on behalf of Defendant, 
delivered the January 13 Letter to Plaintiff's attorneys, wherein Defendant made certain 
commitments and promises to Plaintiff, including the following: ( 1) Plaintiff had the right to 
purchase the Bid Properties for $2.8 million; (2) Defendant would close on the sale of the Bid 
Properties to Plaintiff, regardless of whether Plaintiff was willing to treat this transaction as a 
tax-free distribution of property; (3) Defendant would pay $350,000 to Plaintiff to reimburse him 
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for the amounts Smith Chevrolet advanced on behalf of Staffwood, as alleged above; and ( 4) 
Defendant would agree to a conveyance to Plaintiff of one of the Staffwood Property Sets, at 
Plaintiff's election. 
82. Defendant knew and expected, or reasonably should have known and expected, 
that the promises set forth in the January 13 Letter would induce reliance by Plaintiff. 
83. Plaintiff has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the above-referenced 
promises and commitments in the January 13 Letter. 
84. Defendant has repudiated the commitments and promises he made in the January 
13 Letter, and now refuses to honor the commitments and promises set forth therein. 
85. Defendant must be estopped from repudiating and reneging on his commitments 
and promises as set forth in the January 13 Letter. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendant as follows: 
I. Under his First Claim for Relief, 
a. For specific perfom1ance of the terms, conditions and provisions of the 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by means of a court decree ordering Defendant to 
complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perfom1 his other obligations under the 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement; 
b. For compensation incidental to the decree of specific perfo1mancc as set 
forth above, according to proof; and 
c. For Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, 
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which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Bid Properties 
Purchase Agreement, all in an amount to be established at trial, which amount exceeds 
$500,000.00; 
2. Under his Second Claim for Relief 
a. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the tenns, conditions and 
provisions of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering 
Defendant, among other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in 
accordance with the terms thereof, and perform his other obligations under, the Division 
of Staffwood Properties Agreement; 
b. For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set 
forth above, according to proof; and 
c. For Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, 
which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00; 
3. Under his Third Claim for Relief, for Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental 
and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of his 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at triai, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00; 
4. Under his Fourth Claim for Relief, for an order estopping Defendant from 
repudiating his commitments and promises in the January 13 Letter as alleged above, and an 
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order declaring that Defendant is obligated to comply with said commitments and promises; 
5. For an award of Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
this matter; 
6. For pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate pem1itted by law; 
and 
7. For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a 
matter of Jaw or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper. 
DATED this ih day of March, 2014. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Kara L Pettit 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L Smith 
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EXHIBIT A 
Stanley J. Preston 
II 
PRESTON & Scon 
ATTOR.NEYS AT LAW 
December 20, 2013 
VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL 
l\1ichael\V.Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith 
Dear Mike and Gregg: 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
Thank you for your letter yesterday and settlement proposal. Stafford is willing to 
purchase the subject properties from Staffwood, including the Outlet Center property, on the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Stafford will pay the of sum $2,800,000 for the properties that 
were the subject of the bid process, which amount is $50,000 more than his last 
bid; 
2. The funds \V oody has escrowed under the bid process will be 
returned to him at closing; 
3. In light of the holidays, the closing on Stafford's purchase will take 
place thirty (30) days from the date the parties sign an agreement as to the terms 
of Stafford's purchase of the subject properties; 
4. The net proceeds from the sale of the subject properties will be 
divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the following obligations: 
a. Payment in full of Staffwood's loan from \\Tells Fargo Bank; 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street. Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621 
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b. Payment to Smith Chevrolet of the funds it has advanced above 
its lease obligation on behalf of Staffwood to ensure adequate 
funds for Staffvvood to pay its ongoing obligations, which 
payment is pursuant to the parties' agreement as set forth in 
Section 10.4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement. These 
obligations include, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes, 
insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the Wells Fargo 
Bank. loan. Exact amounts to be repaid to Smith Chevrolet shall 
be determined by means of an audit conducted by Staffwood's 
accountant, Kevin Oakey, but said amounts are anticipated to be 
in excess of $350,000; and 
c. Staffwood' s retention of a mutually agreed amount as a reserve to 
enable Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations on its remaining 
properties. Stafford recommends that the retained sum should be 
$50,000 but in no event should the retained amount be less than 
$20,000. 
In addition, as you are aware, the sale of Staffwood' s Pocatello property will take place 
in the near future. Woody has agreed to the terms of the sale, but requested that the proceeds 
from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a settlement agreement. Stafford estimates 
that the net proceeds from this sale will be approximately $230,000. Assuming the sale takes 
place as planned, it is proposed that the net proceeds from this sale be distributed to the partners 
once an agreement is signed in writing regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid properties 
or, alternatively, that these funds be distributed simultaneously with the closing of Stafford's 
purchase of the bid properties. 
Of course, once we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase of the bid properties, we 
will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing Staffwood' s remaining properties 
between the partners. Please let me lmow as soon as possible whether the foregoing is 
acceptable to your client. 
Michael Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
December 20, 2013 
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Sincerely, 
cc: Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail) 
Michael R Carlston (via electronic mail) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail) 
EXHIBITB 
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SALT LAKE CITY OFFlCE 
PO Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0385 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
801 532-1500m 
801 532-7543 FAX 
www.rqn.com 
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
PURSUANT TO UT AH RULE OF EVIDENCE 408 
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail 
Stanley J. Preston 
Preston & Scott 
178 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Smith v. Smith 
Dear Stan: 
Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 
20, 2013. 
ovo oFFicE For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth below further detail ~~ North University Ave about our understanding of the terms of settlement. In paragraph no. 8 below, we 
Suite 43
0
°h propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done 
Provo, ta fr b · W d ' b I' h b · th · 8460 1.4420 on a tax ee as1s. oo y s accountants e 1eve t at y treating e entire 
801 342_24oom transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interests in Sta:ffwood, the 
801 375-8379 FAX parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax consequences. 
This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this provision is outside of 
the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that we do not require Stafford's 
agreement to paragraph no. 8. 
Also, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the Sta:ffwood 
property, which we have set forth below. It does not matter to Woody which 
election Stafford makes of these two Property Sets. We do not see how the property 
can be divided any other way without resulting in joint or adjacent ownership of any 
properties, which may cause conflict or irritation in the future. 
Accordingly, the points of understanding are as follows: 
1. Stafford closes on the 3 bid properties at $2.8 million ("Closing"), which 
Closing is to be held within 30 days 1 of the date hereof. 
2. Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon 
finalizing this Agreement. 
1 You indicated that Stafford needed 30 days because of the holidays. Now that the holidays have 
passed, Woody is willing to close this in a much shorter time frame if Stafford is able to do so. 
Earlier closing will also save the parties additional interest. 
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3. All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and shall 
disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of Wells Fargo loan (assumed to be about 
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet 
and other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000.2 
Balance of funds from Closing shall be distributed equally to the partners. 
4. The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash 
as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or 
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by 
Stafford. 
Pro e SetA 
*Snake River Landing Pro erty 
Less: $400,000 Cash to Property B 
Reci ient 
Pro e SetB 
Bellon Road Property 
Blackfoot property 
*Recipient A assumes and pays, and holds Recipient B harmless from, the 
$1.9 million note and deed of trust pertaining to this property. 
**Recipient B shall receive all proceeds from the recent sale of this property. 
5. Staf:fwnod's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be 
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in 
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity 
of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off. 
6. Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall 
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer 
of funds shall occur prior to Closing.3 
7. TI1e parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing 
to Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them 
from Staffwood, and ( c) owing to each other ( except for (i) continuing 
obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November 10, 2010 
Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties 
pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 
2 An audit ofthis amount would delay the Closing. Woody proposes to set this at $350,000 and be 
done with it 
3 This avoids piecemeal settlement and motivates the parties to close. As mentioned in footnote I 
above, Woody is ready to close as soon as Stafford is able. 
Stanley l Preston 
January 2014 
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Settlement Agreement), if any, shall released settled by 
Agreement. 
8. In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to 
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which 
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash 
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal 
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in 
Staffwood. If the parties cannot. agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid 
properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth 
above. 
9. Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of 
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031 
like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action 
which increases the tax burden of the other party. 
10. Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, 
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in 
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon 
completion of the 1031 transaction. 
We look forward to hearing how Stafford would like to proceed. 
cc: Michael R. Carlston 
Woodruff Smith 
Hal Bennett 
Damian Smith 
1266871 
Sincerely, 
;;e.,UfNNEY & 
_,, Jha/ . pence 
Greggory J. Savage 
BEKER,P.C . 
. 1__ 
EXHIBITC 
Stanley Preston 
from: Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com> 
Thursday, February 06, 2014 1:26 PM Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Stanley Preston; "mcarlston@scmlaw.com' (mcarlston@scmlaw.com)' 
Michael Spence 
Subject: RE: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing 
We understand that Woody and the folks advising him generally agree with the computations in the Exhibit A you 
provided and it seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of 
issues that has been provided to us: 
1. Woody's return of his $292,500 deposit is irrelevant to this closing, because he is just receiving his own money 
back. Given the limited nature of the matters remaining for resolution, there seems to be no reason why he 
shouldn't get the deposit back immediately. We note that Stafford received a return of his earnest money the 
day after he elected to cease bidding. At this point, Woody's deposit is unnecessary because he is not obligated 
to provide funds to complete this deal. Therefore, we would like the deposit refunded immediately and Exhibit 
A amended to remove all reference to the deposit, because to an outsider (such as the IRS) looking at these 
documents, it appears that Woody is getting the full $688,867 out of this transaction, which he is not. 
2. We see that the computation presumes that Stafford will bring $2.8 million to the closing. Woody's tax 
professionals have advised both parties, in order to treat this as a sale Stafford will need to bring in the $2.8M 
and let it flow through the transaction. We realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange 
of the 3 bid properties under our Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution wherein 
he makes a contribution sufficient to get the 3 bid properties plus the Property B properties, and Woody gets 
Property A plus $395,967 (as adjusted for closing costs)? This would allow Stafford to bring less than the $2.8 
million to the closing and would result in less taxes for both parties. Please advise whether Stafford is willing to 
consider this. 
3. Since the parties will be paying property taxes, utilities, etc., on a prospective basis, we don't see any need to 
keep money in Staffwood. Does this distribution provide for any money to remain in Staffwood? How much 
remains in the Staffwood account(s}? 
4. Woody is fine with Stafford managing the process relative to the gift of property to the City of Idaho Falls, but 
the agreement needs to provide that Woody receives th,: exact same attribution of the gift as Stafford, and that 
Woody's agreement is obtained prior to implementation. 
5. As we understand it, upon completion of this closing, the only matters remaining between the parties (other 
than Stafford's note to Woody as you have documented) are the following: 
a. Future dealings relating to SV Idaho and its eventual liquidation. Does Stafford claim Woody owes any 
money to SV Idaho or to Stafford relative to SV Idaho? If there is any disagreement on this, we would 
like to resolve it now. Also, there is the $500,000 to be written off. How does Stafford propose to deal 
with this between the partners? 
b. First right of refusal to buy the other's business. This hurts the marketability of both brothers' 
businesses, and is another potential matter for conflict in the future. Is Stafford willing to terminate this 
provision. 
c. Woody also requests that the one year non-hiring provision be terminated. We would like to have 
employees at either partner's business free to bEi empioyed where they choose. 
6. Subject to the foregoing items and receipt of the following documents, Woody is prepared to close: 
a. Draft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement; 
b. Revised Exhibit A as requested above; 
be 
Thanks. 
Gregg Savage 
Title on the Snake River Landing 
d. Settlement Statement from the title company crm,wir,cr 
From: Stanley Preston [mailto:sjp@prestonandscott.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 9:52 AM 
To: Michael Spence; Greggory Savage 
Cc: Mike carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan M. Scott; Damian Smith 
Subject: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing 
Mike and Gregg, 
how disbursements are to 
Attached is a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown for the closing we have proposed. Obviously we don't yet 
know the title fees and closing costs that will need to added to this spreadsheet, but this is essentially what we propose 
will be Exhibit A to the Addendum to Escrow Instructions I sent you last week, and the reference to Exhibit Bin the 
Addendum will also be changed to reference this document as well. When do you anticipate getting back to us on our 
proposal. We would like to close this matter this week. Regards, Stan 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250 
SLC, UT 84101 
Tel.: 801-869-1620 
Fax: 801-869-1621 
DD: 801-869-1623 
sjp@prestonandscott.com 
www.prestonandscott.com 
The Information contained In this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended 
recipient ls our client, then this Information ls also a prlvlleged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this Information 
is prohibited. If you have received this communication In error, do not read It. Please delete It from your system without copying it, and notify the 
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
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EXHIBITD 
Stanley J. Preston 
II 
PRESTON &_ Scorr 
AITORNEYS AT LAW 
January 30, 2014 
• 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
VL4 ELECTRONIC MAIL 
lvlichaelW. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith 
Dear lvlike and Gregg: 
Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the 
terms communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013. Please be advised that 
Stafford is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined 
in your letter dated January 13, 2014, and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B. 
Enclosed is a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a Closing 
regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the transfer 
of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford, as well as drafts of the Special 
Warranty Deeds to be attached as Exhibits to the Addendum. We have noted one change in the 
Special Warranty Deed to Woody where it states that it is further subject to a development lien, 
we are going to change this deed so that it specifically references the encumbrance in question. 
Also, Stafford is in the process of preparing Exhibit A to the Addendum, and we will forward 
these two exhibits to you as soon as they are available. In recognition of the parties' desire to 
accomplish this as soon as possible, Stafford proposes that this Closing take place tomorrow, 
Friday, January 31, at 2:00 p.m. 
The accountants are still in the process of advising our clients regarding whether to 
structure the transfer of the Staffwood properties as a sale or liquidation. Stafford anticipates 
that he will be provide a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody 
choose which way be wants to proceed. 
In the meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement 
Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered by the 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621 
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enclosed Addendum. This settlement agreement will need to address at least the following 
issues: 
1. A mutual release of all claims between the parties. 
2. Woody's agreement to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless with 
respect to the deed of encumbering the Snalrn River Landing Property for which 
Sunnyview, LLC, is the beneficiary. 
3. The parties' agreement that, upon the Closing pursuant to the Addendum, all 
debts, claims or obligations: (a) owing to Staffwood from Stafford and Woody 
and their respective entities; (b) owing to them from Staffwood; and ( c) owing to 
each other ( except for (i) continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 
3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing 
obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to 
Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and 
settled as part of this Settlement. 
4. The conveyance to the City ofldaho Falls of the seven acre plot west of the Snake 
River, with each partner receiving equal benefit of the tax write off. The gift of 
this property, however, must be made contingent upon the City building an 
appropriate park by a specified date. Stafford has worked on these arrangements 
and should see this through. Without this condition, the park may not be built in 
the parties' lifetimes. Stafford has been negotiating and working with the City 
and other parties in the planning of the park, and he has been working to bring in 
other major donor groups to ensure the park will be worthy of Staffwood's land 
donation and will be a true legacy. The parties will need to agree that Stafford 
should continue to take the lead in the planning a.nd negotiations with the City. 
For these reasons, the timing of the donation should not be stipulated in the 
parties' settlement agreement 
5. The structure of the transaction as either a sale or a liquidation, with the resulting 
impact on the continuing existence of Staff\;vood, as set fori-.h in paragraphs 9 and 
Michael Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
January 30, 2014 
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10 of your January 13, 2014 letter, provided that Woody will make a decision on 
this issue within sixty days of Stafford presenting the options to Woody. 
6. A provision that the terms and condi1ions of the November 10, 2010 Settlement 
Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force 
and effect except as amended by the terms of the third settlement agreement. 
7. Inasmuch as Sta:ffwood will not be liquidated at the Closing, and it will have 
some continuing obligations, the parties will agree to leave a nominal amoi.mt in 
the Staffwood account. 
Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed 
Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement 
agreement along the lines proposed herein. Once we are in agreement on these two points, I will 
begin preparing the settlement agreement. 
Sincerely, 
Encls. 
cc: Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail w/encls.) 
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail w/encls.) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail wlencls.) 
EXHIBITE 
Stanley Preston 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Mike, 
Stanley Preston 
Thursday, February 2014 1:05 AM 
'Michael Spence' 
Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>; Mike Carlston (rncarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan 
M. Scott; 'Damian Smith' 
Closing on Staffwood Properties 
Addendum to Escrow Instructions 02-20-14.docx; Analysis of Staffwood Sale and 
Distribution 02-20-14.xls; Release of Escrow Funds 02-20-14.docx 
In my email dated February 13, 2014,. I quoted from our prior written communications wherein our respective clients 
reached an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of other real 
property owned by Staffwood Partnership, as well as Woody eJ<press, written representation that he was willing to go 
forward with a Closing to effect the conveyance of the subject real property. 
It is, therefore, extremely disappointing that Woody would fail to follow through with his contractual obligation to 
complete this Closing in a timely manner and, instead, leave the country for an extended period of time, and thereby 
leave this important matter unconcluded. It is particularly troubling that Woody would do this without the courtesy of 
notifying us beforehand, and without making any provision that would allow you as his counsel to contact him. 
Please be advised that my client1s patience has reached its limit, both as to Woody's unjustified delays and failure to 
complete the required Closing, as well as his repeated attempts to renegotiate the terms of the parties' prior 
agreements. Accordingly, we expect Woody to proceed with the Closing immediately upon his return from his trip, 
which we understand from your representation will be this coming Sunday. To accomplish this, we have scheduled the 
Closing for Tuesday, February 25, 2014, at 2:00 p.m., as outlined in the attached Addendum to Escrow Instructions, the 
Exhibit A to the Addendum, and the Release of Escrow Funds, which have been revised and prepared to accommodate 
Woody's request that the Closing make no reference to the return of his escrow funds. 
We believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement. If, however, you have any suggested 
changes to these documents please advise me immediately, provided that any such suggested changes are consistent 
with the terms of the parties' agreement. Also, to the extent Woody desires to order title insurance on any of the 
properties that are being conveyed to him, please notify the Escrow Agent as soon as possible. Finally, please send me 
copies of the attached agreements with the required signatures from Woody, Woody's wife, and the WDS Limited 
Partnership, by Monday, February 24, 2014. 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & scon 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250 
SLC, UT 84101 
Tel.: 801-869-1620 
Fax: 801-869-1621 
DD: 801-869-1623 
sip@prestonandscott.com 
www.prestonandscott.com 
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The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and so ly for the use of the intended 
recipient. if the intended recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client 
communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information is prohibited. If you have received this 
communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the sender bye-
mail or 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
From: Michael Spence [mailto:mspence@RQN.COM] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 18{ 2014 4:10 PM 
To: Stanley Preston 
Subject: "Alias Smith & Jones" 
Stan, I have "heard" back from Woody's in house folks. Woody is out of the country and they/we don't expect to "hear 
or see" back from him until this coming Sunday, notwithstanding our efforts to contact him beforehand. If he is at the 
Olympics (which I seriously doubt), I hope he enjoys the 70 degree weather over there! Sorry. Mike 
Michael Spence I Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. I 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 I Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Direct: 801-323-33811 Facsimile: 801-532-75431 www.rqn.com 
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not 
intended to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting, 
marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be 
privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately. 
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ADDENDUM AND 
Addendum to and (" Addendum") is by 
individually and his capacity as a general partner of SLS 1 LLLP, successor to 
SLS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general 
partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general partner of The 
WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general 
partnership ("Woody"). This Addendum is given by Stafford and Woody to TitleOne Title and 
Escrow Company ("Escrow Agent") to augment those certain instructions given to Escrow 
Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those certain Settlement 
Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 ("Initial Escrow Instruction") and 
additional property referred to herein ("Deeded Property"). 
In consideration of mutual covenants and agreements and the fulfillment of the instructions 
contained in this Addendum, the parties agree and instruct the Escrow Agent, as follows: 
1. Closing: The Closing shall be on Tuesday, February 25, 2014 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. Mountain 
Time at the office of the Escrow Agent located at 400 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
83402, or such other time and place as Stafford and Woody may agree, in writing delivered to 
Escrow Agent. At Closing, the following shall occur: 
A. Stafford shall deposit certified funds in the amounts required herein. 
B. The Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded the deeds referenced in 
paragraph 3 hereof. 
C. The Escrow Agent shall obtain from Wells Fargo Bank, National Association 
and file or record terminations, releases, and deeds of re-conveyance sufficient 
and necessary to remove the liens and encumbrances listed on "Schedule 1," 
attached hereto, which Schedule shall be prepared by Escrow Agent. 
D. Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sums described in paragraph 2.C. 
hereof. 
E. Real property truces and assessments shall not be apportioned between Woody 
and Stafford. Rather each parcel is being conveyed subject to accrued and 
accruing real property truces and assessments. 
F. The Closing costs shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership. Each party has the 
option of ordering and obtaining standard owner's policies ohitle insurance on 
any of the Deeded Property that is conveyed to such party pursuant to Closing, the 
premium for which shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership; provided, however, 
that each party shall immediately notify Escrow Agent of its decision to order any 
such title insurance so as not to delay Closing. Escrow Agent accepts 
responsibility for the condition of title only to the extent as established by and in 
accordance with the policies of title insurance purchased as a pa.rt of the Closing. 
2. Collection of Funds and Disbursements:. Agent shall accept and/or disburse to 
following funds: 
~A,JU""""' accept additional funds in the amount set forth 
Exhibit A, attached hereto, together with a sum equal to one half (1h) of the fees and 
costs charged by the Escrow Agent for Closing services. In addition Escrow Agent 
shall disburse to Wells Fargo Bank, National Association all sums necessary to 
satisfy the obligations and obtain the release of those liens and encumbrances listed 
on "Schedule l ", attached hereto, with a payout date of the amounts due to Wells 
Fargo Bank, National Association as of January 14, 2014, with Stafford responsible 
for paying any interest that has accrued since that date. 
B. At Closing, collect from Staffwood Partnership, or at its direction, all sums 
necessary to pay the premium cost of title insurance ordered by the parties 
relating to the Deeded Property. 
C. At Closing, disburse to WDS Limited Partnership the sum set forth in Exhibit 
A, attached hereto, less a sum equal to one half (Yz) of the fees and costs of 
Escrow Agent incurred in the Closing. 
3. Recording of Deeds: At Closing the Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded 
the following Special Warranty Deeds: 
A A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit B", attached hereto, conveying to 
Woody the property commonly known as the Snake River Landing Property, subject to 
accrued and accruing real property taxes and assessments and to liens and encumbrances 
ofrecord, including but not limited to that deed of trust recorded as instrument number 
1176756 recorded February 2, 2005 with Staffwood Partnership as Grantor, 
AMERTITLE, INC, as Trustee and SUNNYVIEW LLC as beneficiary, which obligation 
Woody agrees to assume and pay and to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless 
therefrom. 
B. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit C", attached hereto, 
conveying to Stafford the properties located in Bonneville County, State of Idaho 
and commonly known as the RV Property, the Smith Chevrolet Property, the Bellin 
Road Property and the Pioneer Road Property, subject to accrued and accruing 
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record but free of the lien of Wells 
Fargo Bank, National Association as described in paragraph 2. A hereof. 
C. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit D", attached hereto, 
conveying to Stafford the property located in Bingham County, State ofidaho and 
commonly known as the "Blackfoot Property," subject to accrued and accruing 
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record. 
4. The Parties' Prior Settlement Agreements: The terms and conditions of the November 
10, 2010 Settlement Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full 
force and effect except as amended by the terms of this Addendum. 
2 
this of February, 
WoodruffD. Smith, general partner 
Dawn Smith, general partner 
WoodruffD. Smith, individually 
3 
this_ day February, 20 
Stafford L. Smith, general partner 
Shelly Smith, general partner 
Stafford L. Smith, individually 
4 
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Staffwood Property Division 
Sale of Property to Stafford 
property Sale Analysis 
Cash paid to Staffwood 
Wells Note Balance Jan 14 
Adjustments to payoff + -
Payment to Smith Chevrolet 
Title Insurance and Closing Costs 
Remaining amount to distribute 
RV Building 
Smith Chevrolet _ 
Woody's Automotive Building 
RV Building Land 
Vet Clinic Land 
Woody's Automotive Land 
Smith Chevrolet Land 
Total Basis 
Sales Price 
Gain on sale of assets in Staffwood 
!Cash Analysis 
Sale Proceeds 
2,800,000.00 
(858,066.00) 
(350,000.00) 
1,591,934.00 
Adjusted Basis 
371,040.40 
354,230.10 
232,596.78 
195,500.00 
134,421.31 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
1,327,788.59 
2,800,000.00 
1,472,211.41 
ash distribution (will be reduced by TitleOne costs) 
Cash to Stafford from Woody to equalize A/B 
Proceeds from Pocatello 
Payment to Smith Chevrolet 
Net Cash In at Closing 
:rax Basis of Property to Distribute at closing 
Team Automotive Pocatello Building 
Team Automotive Pocatello Land 
Note plus adjustments to equal $858,066 at date of closing. Stafford's responsibility 
Amount determined prior to closing 
less closing costs and insurance 
Stafford 
(2,800,000) 
795,967 
400,000 
239,843 
(1,364.190) 
Tax Basis 
152,782 
20,000 
Woody 
795,967 
(400,000) 
395,967 
Staffwood Smith Chev 
-239843 
350,000 
Team Automotive Blackfoot Building 
Team Automotive Blackfoot Land 
Bellin Road land (Milligan) 
Land Snake River Parkway 
147,086 
10,000 
296,751 
Tax Basis 
488,559 
RELEASE OF ESCROW FUNDS WDS LIMITED 
individually and in capacity as a general partner of 
successor to The Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, 
an Idaho general partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general 
partner of The WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an 
Idaho general partnership ("Woody") hereby instruct TitleOne Title and Escrow Company 
("Escrow Agent") as follows: 
Immediately upon completion of the Closing pursuant to the Addendum to 
Escrow and Closing Instructions ("Addendum") previously signed by Stafford 
and Woody, Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sum of $292,500 
previously deposited by Woody pursuant to those certain instructions given to 
Escrow Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those 
certain Settlement Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 
("Initial Escrow Instruction"), less only the administrative costs of the Escrow 
Agent. 
The parties further acknowledge that said disbursement of funds to Woody constitutes a return 
to Woody of his own funds that he had previously deposited with Escrow Agent pursuant to 
Initial Escrow Instruction, and that these are not new or additional funds that he is receiving 
pursuant to the Closing under the Addendum. 
DATED this_day of February, 2014 
THE WDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
WoodruffD. Smith, general partner 
Dawn Smith, general partner 
WoodruffD. Smith, individually 
Stafford L. Smith, general partner 
Shelly Smith, general partner 
Stafford L. Smith, individually 
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EXHIBITF 
2 
Stanley J. Preston 
II 
PRESTON & Scorr 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
March 3, 2014 
• 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith 
Dear Mike and Gregg: 
As previously explained in prior correspondence and electronic communications between 
us, it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered into an enforceable 
settlement agreement regarding: (1) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties for the sum of 
$2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain remaining Staffwood properties, whereby Woody will 
receive what has been designated as the Property Set A, and Stafford will receive Property Set B. 
We have reviewed applicable Idaho law on this issue and concluded it supports Stafford's 
position. 
Stafford has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement 
on these two primary issues and Stafford is, and has been since January 30, 2014, fully prepared 
to close on this settlement and meet all of his obligations related thereto. Stafford is suffering 
damage as a result of Woody's refusal to timely close on the agreed terms. At this point, unless 
this matter closes in the next few days, Stafford will be forced to use his own funds to pay off the 
liens and obligations owed by Staffwood to Wells Fargo Bank. 
Accordingly, Stafford hereby demands that the parties perform the required Closing on 
Thursday, March 6, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. pursuant to the terms set forth in my email to you dated 
February 20, 2014, and the documents attached thereto. If the Closing does not take place by 
March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties' 
settlement agreement and recover the damages Stafford has suffered. 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801 -869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621 
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Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
March 3, 2014 
Page2 
Of course, if you have any suggested changes to the proposed Addendum to Escrow 
Instructions, the Analysis of Staffwood Sale and Distribution, or the Release of Escrow Funds, 
that I emailed to you on February 20, 2014, we wiH certainly consider them, so long as they do 
not materially change the terms of the parties' agreement. 
Finally, this letter once again confirms Stafford's willingness post-Closing to endeavor to 
work with Woody to obtain the most mutually beneficial tax treatment reasonably possible. 
According to Staffwood's accountant, completing the transactions in accordance with the agreed 
terms provides the most favorable opportunity that will be available to minimize the tax 
obligations of the parties. Hopefully, your client will see the wisdom in getting this resolved at 
this time based on the terms to which the parties have agreed. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail.) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail) 
Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276) 
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending) 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 869-1620 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
EX PARTE MOTION TO SEAL 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
Pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
("Plaintiff') respectfully submits this Ex Parte Motion to Seal Amended Complaint. 
The Amended Complaint and its Exhibits contain confidential settlement 
communications between the parties' attorneys, protected by Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff moves to seal the Amended Complaint filed 
concurrently with this motion. 
5 
DATED this ti'11 of March~ 2014. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 11 ~---:;;;;;-------
Kara L. Pettit 
Attorneysfor PlaintlJtStafford L; Smith 
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Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276) 
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 869-1620 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
ST AFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Filed Under Seal) 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
I 
Kara Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276) 
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 05 Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 869-1620 
Attorneysfor Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Filed Under Seal) 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith ("Plaintiff') hereby complains against Defendant WoodruffD. 
Smith ("Defendant") as follows: 
PARTIES AND JUIUSDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing the State of Idaho. 
3. Plaintiff, through an Idaho limited liability partnership known as The SLS 1, LLP 
(formerly known as The SLS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership), is a fifty 
percent (50%) owner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general partnership ("Staffwood"). 
4. Defendant, through an Idaho limited partnership known as The WDS Limited 
Partnership is a fifty percent (50%) owner of Staffwood. 
5. Staffwood is the owner of various properties that are the subject of this case, and 
all of these properties are located in Bonneville County, Idaho, with the exception of one 
property which is located in Bingham County, Idaho. 
6. Plaintiff and Defendant are brothers. 
7. Many of the acts and omissions at issue in this Complaint took place in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Plaintiff resides in Bonneville County, Idaho. Staffwood's principal 
place of business is located in Bonneville County, Idaho. In addition, this case involves real 
estate and other property located in Bonneville and Bingham Counties, Idaho. Jurisdiction and 
venue are therefore proper in this Court. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Over the years, Plaintiff and Defendant have had various business relationships. 
In approximately 20 l 0, disputes arose between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the respective 
ownership interest each party had in certain businesses, and the manner in which the businesses 
have been managed. Based on these disputes, Plaintiff and Defendant asserted and alleged 
various legal claims against each other. 
9. an to resolve their disputes and differences with each other, and to 
2 
separate ownership of the car dealerships and other businesses they had jointly owned, Plaintiff 
and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement, effective November l 0, 2010 (the "20 l 0 
Settlement Agreement"), whereby ownership of the various car dealerships and certain other 
businesses in which Plaintiff and Defendant had joint ownership were divided between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. 
10. As part of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of 
themselves and their various business entities, entered into mutual releases of all claims. 
11. The closing of the 20 l O Settlement Agreement took place on or about 
February 10, 2011. 
12. Subsequent to the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, a lawsuit was 
filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, entitled 
Woodruff D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case No. CV-11-1772 (the 
"Lawsuit"), wherein Plaintiff and Defendant asserted various claims and counterclaims 
against each other arising under the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise. 
13. During the course of discovery related to the Lawsuit, the parties determined 
that there were additional disputes between them that were not addressed in the Lawsuit. 
14. Ultimately, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a second Settlement Agreement, 
effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 Settlement Agreement"), whereby Plaintiff and Defendant 
settled all additional claims and disputes between themselves and their various business entities 
that were asserted in the Lawsuit, and that they had otherwise discovered. 
15. part of the 2012 Settlement Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of 
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themselves and their various business entities, entered into mutual releases of all claims, and the 
Lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. 
16. At all relevant times hereto, Michael Spence and Greggory Savage of the law firm 
of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. (collectively "RQN") have served as Defendant's attorneys. 
Among other things, RQN represented Defendant and his business entities in the disputes that 
led up to the 2010 Settlement Agreement, in the negotiation and finalization of the 2010 
Settlement Agreement, in the Lawsuit and related disputes thereto, and in the negotiation and 
finalization of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. 
17. At all times relevant hereto, RQN have held themselves out as the attorneys for 
Defendant, with full authority to negotiate and enter into agreements on behalf of Defendant and 
his business entities. In fact, RQN has routinely and repeatedly asserted that it represents 
Defendant in the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant over the past several years, as well as 
in the disputes, negotiations, written communications and agreements that give rise to this case. 
18. Under the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant 
agreed on terms regarding the management of Staffwood, in which they each continued to have a 
fifty percent (50%) ownership interest. These terms included a provision whereby Plaintiff and 
Defendant agreed to appoint a mutually acceptable third member to the Board of Staffwood for 
the purpose of breaking any deadlock between Plaintiff and Defendant as the other two members 
of Staffwood's Board. In accordance with the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff 
and Defendant jointly agreed to the appointment of a third Board member. 
19. Under terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, as amended by the 2012 
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Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant also agreed to a procedure whereby the parties 
had the right to initiate a bid process for the purpose of purchasing real property owned by 
Staff wood. 
20. In early 2013, Plaintiff initiated this bid process by making a bid to purchase three 
properties leased by Smith Chevrolet Co. ("Smith Chevrolet"), which is owned by Plaintiff: (1) 
the building and related real property occupied by Smith Chevrolet (the "Smith Chevrolet 
Property"); (2) the building and related real property occupied by an RV dealership owned by 
Plaintiff (the "RV Property"); and (3) a certain building and related real property known as the 
Outlet Property (the "Outlet Property"). The Smith Chevrolet Property, the RV Property and the 
Outlet Property are collectively referred to herein as the "Bid Properties." 
21. Staffwood had previously obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank (the "WFB 
Loan"), which loan was secured by the RV Property and a guarantee of Staffwood' s assets. 
Smith Chevrolet advanced funds on behalf of Staffwood substantially in excess of Smith 
Chevrolet's obligations for leasing the Bid Properties, for the purpose of ensuring that Staffwood 
had adequate funds to pay its ongoing obligations, which included, but are not limited to, 
accounting costs, taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the WFB Loan. 
22. Under the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Staffwood agreed to reimburse Smith 
Chevrolet for amounts it paid on behalf of Staffwood to make the payments on the WFB Loan, 
and to meet the other obligations identified in the previous paragraph, to the extent these funds 
exceeded the amount Smith Chevrolet was obligated to pay Staffwood for Smith Chevrolet's 
lease of the Bid Properties. 
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23. By the end of 2013, the amount Staffwood owed to Smith Chevrolet for the funds 
Smith Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease 
obligation exceeded $350,000. Defendant has never paid Stafford his 50% share of this 
obligation. 
24. By the end of 2013, the outstanding principal balance owed by Staffwood on the 
WFB Loan exceeded $850,000.00. 
25. In response to Plaintiffs bid to purchase the Bid Properties, Defendant submitted 
his own bid for the Bid Properties, and the parties traded bids for the Bid Properties for several 
months. 
26. After Defendant made the final bid for the Bid Properties, he then improperly 
asserted that he was unwilling to purchase the Bid Properties unless Plaintiff and Staffwood 
agreed to satisfy and meet certain unjustified and unreasonable demands and conditions related 
to the Bid Properties, which Plaintiff was unwilling to do. This resulted in a new dispute 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
27. In addition, the title company that reviewed the ownership of the Bid Properties 
discovered that Smith Chevrolet is the record title owner of the Outlet Property, which created an 
issue as to whether Staffwood or Smith Chevrolet was the owner of the Outlet Property. 
28. As the parties worked to resolve their disputes regarding the Bid Properties and 
the conditions and demands that Defendant claimed had to be satisfied before he would purchase 
the Bid Properties pursuant to the bid process, the third member of Staffwood's Board resigned 
in response to unsupported threats and accusations made by Defendant and/or 
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Defendant's agents. As a result, Staffwood was paralyzed and unable to take any action where 
Plaintiff and Defendant were not both in agreement. 
29. In an effort to negotiate a resolution of this dispute regarding the purchase of the 
Bid Properties, a series of meetings and communications took place between RQN as 
Defendant's attorneys and Plaintiffs attorneys. 
30. Plaintiff's attorneys subsequently sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to 
Defendant's attorneys, RQN, (the "December 20 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 
A, whereby Plaintiff made a settlement offer to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the Bid 
Properties, wherein Plaintiff offered to purchase the Bid Properties based on the following 
material terms: 
a. Plaintiff would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and 
b. The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be divided 
between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the amounts Staffwood 
owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds Smith Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of 
Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations, as alleged above. See 
Exhibit A. 
31. In response, RQN sent Plaintiff's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the 
"January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, wherein RQN, as Defendant's 
attorneys, expressly stated, "Woody hereby accepts [Plaintiff's] offer as set forth in your letter of 
December 20, 2013 ." Exhibit B. Significantly, Defendant and his accountant, Hal Bennett were 
copied on the January 13 Letter. 
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32. In the January 13 Letter, Defendant also expressly stated the following regarding 
his understanding of the two material terms offered by Plaintiff in the December 20 Letter 
regarding Plaintiffs offer to purchase the Bid Properties: 
a. "[Plaintiff] closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million." Exhibit B; and 
b. "All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and 
shall be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of [the WFB Loan] (assumed to be about 
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and other 
expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds shall be 
distributed equally to the partners." Exhibit B. 
33. In the January 13 Letter, Defendant stated, 
In paragraph no. 8, below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way 
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis. [Defendant's] accountants 
believe that by treating the entire transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the 
parties' interest in Staffwood, the parties can come out the same as agreed 
without incurring negative tax consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to 
both parties, but since this provision is outside of the terms of [Plaintiff's] offer, 
we make clear that we do not require [Plaint{ff's] agreement to [this proposal]. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
34. Specifically, paragraph no. 8 of the January 13 Letter, stated as follows: 
In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to 
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which 
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and 
property hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of Staffwood 
assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. Jf the parties 
cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent 
divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above. 
( emphasis added). 
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35. In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit C, RQN again urged Plaintiff to acquire the Bid Properties 
as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal that the parties 
had agreed to, and stated, "[ w ]e realize that [Plaintiff] has the right to treat this as a sale and 
exchange of the [Bid Properties] .... " Exhibit C. 
36. While there was some additional back and forth on some other non-material 
terms, regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between 
the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance 
regarding the material terms for Plaintiff's purchase of the Bid Properties. 
37. Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for 
Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties, which agreement is hereafter referred to as the "Bid 
Properties Purchase Agreement." 
38. In addition to accepting Plaintiff's offer to purchase the Bid Properties in the 
January 13 Letter, Defendant also made an offer regarding the division of the remaining real 
property owned by Staffwood. See Exhibit B. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that 
"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ... 
[and Plaintiff] shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B, and [Defendant] 
shall receive the Property Set not elected by [Plaintiff]." Id. 
39. Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River 
Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Prope1iy 
Set B consisted of the Bellin Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the recent 
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sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient. See id. 
40. In response to Defendant's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on 
the terms set forth in the January 13 Letter, Plaintiff's attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated 
January 30, 2014 (the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D, which 
stated, "[Plaintiff] is pleased that [Defendant] has accepted [Plaintiffs] settlement offer based on 
the terms communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that [Plaintiff] is 
willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined in [the 
January 13 Letter], and [Plaintiff] has decided to choose Property Set B." Exhibit D. 
41. Again, while there was some back and forth on other non-material terms, 
regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between the 
attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance 
regarding the material terms for the division of Staffwood' s remaining real property between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
42. Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for 
dividing between themselves the remaining real property owned by Staffwood, which contract is 
hereafter referred to as the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement." 
43. In reliance on Defendant's representations and promises, Plaintiff communicated 
to Defendant that he was ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions 
agreed to under both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement ( collectively, the "Agreements"), and convey the properties in accordance 
with the terms of the Agreements. See February 20, 2014 Emaii from Stanley J. Preston to RQN 
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and documents attached thereto, copies of which are attached as Exhibit E. 
44. In response, Defendant has tried to get Plaintiff to agree to new and/or unrelated 
terms that were never part of the Agreements. Finally, Plaintiff sent a formal demand to 
Defendant to comply with the Agreements and to close the transactions agreed to under the 
Agreements. See March 3, 2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit F. 
45. At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been ready, willing, able and fully prepared to 
close on the Agreements and satisfy his contractual obligations under the Agreements. 
46. Defendant has failed and refused to proceed with the required closing of the 
Agreements, in accordance with the terms of the Agreements. 
47. Defendant has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any 
enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and 
acceptances between the parties as set forth above. 
48. Specifically, Defendant is now asserting that the reason the Agreements are not 
binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Defendant's 
insistence that the entire transaction be treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood 
properties. Defendant's position, however, is directly rebutted by the express written statements 
made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email. 
49. The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division 
of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Prope1iies would be a distribution, 
Defendant expressly agreed that Plaintiff had the right to purchase the Bid Properties. 
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50. In the meantime, Plaintiff has now been required to pay-off the WFB Loan on 
Staffwood's behalf with Plaintiffs own funds. The amount required to pay-off the WFB Loan 
. totaled $858,066, half of which amount Defendant is required to pay to Plaintiff as a 50% owner 
of Staffwood. 
51. Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant, as a 50% owner of Staffwood, to pay 
Defendant's share of funds required to pay-off the WFB Loan, which amounts to $429,033, as 
well as Defendant's 50% share of the amount Staft\vood owes Plaintiff for the funds Smith 
Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligation, 
which amounts to an additional $175,000. Defendant has to date failed to pay these sums to 
Plaintiff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement) 
52. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
53. The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable 
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
54. Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential 
terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and certain to 
enable the parties to specifically perform the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
55. The terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement are reasonable and based on 
adequate consideration. 
56. Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of 
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Plaintiff under the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and all conditions precedent that Plaintiff 
agreed to perform pursuant to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement have been satisfied. 
57. Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is fully prepared, to pay the full 
consideration called for in the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and continues to be ready, 
willing and able both to pay the required consideration, and to close the real estate transactions, 
required by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
58. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the 
required closing pursuant to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, or to convey 
the Bid Properties to Plaintiff. 
59. Defendant has breached the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by engaging in 
the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his obligations 
under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement. 
60. The real property that Plaintiff agreed to purchase under the Bid Properties 
Purchase Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has no 
adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, 
other than specific performance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
61. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among other 
things, to complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 
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62. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential, 
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's 
breaches of the Bid Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
63. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement) 
64. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
65. The Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitutes a valid and 
enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
66. Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential 
terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and 
certain to enable the parties to specifically perform the terms of the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement. 
67. The terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement are reasonable and 
based on adequate consideration. 
68. Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of 
Plaintiff under the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, and all conditions precedent that 
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Plaintiff agreed to perform pursuant to the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement have 
been satisfied. 
69. Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is willing, able, ready and fully 
prepared to close the real estate transactions, required by the Division of Staffwood Prope11ies 
Agreement. 
70. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the 
required closing pursuant to the terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, or to 
divide the subject properties and convey them in accordance with the terms of the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement. 
71. Defendant has breached the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by 
engaging in the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his 
obligations under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement. 
72. The real prope11y that Plaintiff is entitled to receive under the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and 
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Division of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement, other than specific performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties 
Agreement. 
73. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among 
other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in accordance with terms 
15 
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and perform his other obligations under, the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement. 
7 4. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Di vision of Staffwood 
Properties Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, 
consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of 
Defendant's breaches of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be 
determined at trial, which amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
75. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Regarding the Agreements) 
76. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
77. Under Idaho law, and inherent in both of the Agreements, are implied covenants 
of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to every 
aspect of these contractual relationships between Plaintiff and Defendant. These covenants of 
good faith and fair dealing prohibit Defendant from intentionally or purposefully doing anything 
which would impair, destroy or injure Plaintiffs right to receive the fruits of the Agreements and 
the ordinary and reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the Agreements. 
78. To comply with these covenants, Defendant had an obligation to act consistently 
with the Agreements' agreed common purposes and Plaintiffs justified and reasonable 
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expectations. 
79. Defendant has breached his covenants of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff 
by engaging in the conduct set forth above. 
80. As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of his covenants of good faith 
and fair dealing, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential, 
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches 
of his covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00. 
81. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
82. Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
83. RQN, with the full authorization of Defendant and on behalf of Defendant, 
delivered the January 13 Letter to Plaintiffs attorneys, wherein Defendant made certain 
commitments and promises to Plaintiff, including the following: (1) Plaintiff had the right to 
purchase the Bid Properties for $2.8 million; (2) Defendant would close on the sale of the Bid 
Properties to Plaintiff, regardless of whether Plaintiff was willing to treat this transaction as a 
tax-fi:ee distribution of property; (3) Staffwood would pay $350,000 to Plaintiff to reimburse him 
for the amounts Smith Chevrolet advanced on behalf of Staffwood, as alleged above, which 
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requires Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of $175,000, which is Defendant's 50% share of this 
obligation; and ( 4) Defendant would agree to a conveyance to Plaintiff of one of the Staffwood 
Property Sets, at Plaintiff's election. 
84. Defendant knew and expected, or reasonably should have known and expected, 
that the promises set forth in the January 13 Letter would induce reliance by Plaintiff. 
85. Plaintiff has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the above-referenced 
promises and commitments in the January 13 Letter. 
86. Defendant has repudiated the commitments and promises he made in the January 
13 Letter, and now refuses to honor the commitments and promises set forth therein. 
87. Defendant must be estopped from repudiating and reneging on his commitments 
and promises as set forth in the January 13 Letter. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendant as follows: 
1. Under his First Claim for Relief, 
a. For specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions of the 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by means of a court decree ordering Defendant to 
complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the 
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement; 
b. For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set 
forth above, according to proof; and 
c. Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, 
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which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Bid Properties 
Purchase Agreement, all in an amount to be established at trial, which amount exceeds 
$500,000.00; 
2. Under his Second Claim for Relief 
a. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and 
provisions of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering 
Defendant, among other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in 
accordance with the terms thereof, and perform his other obligations under, the Division 
of Staffwood Properties Agreement; 
b. For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set 
forth above, according to proof; and 
c. For Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, 
which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00; 
3. Under his Third Claim for Relief, for Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental 
and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of his 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which 
amount exceeds $500,000.00; 
4. Under his Fourth Claim for Relief, for an order estopping Defendant from 
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repudiating his commitments and promises in the January 13 Letter as alleged above, and an 
order declaring that Defendant is obligated to comply with said commitments and promises; 
5. For an award of Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
this matter; 
6. For pre- andpost-judgrnent inforestat the maximum rate permitted by law; 
and 
7. For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a 
matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper. 
DATED this Ii11 day of March, 2014. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
~---------
Kara L. Pettit 
Attorneys.for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
EXHIBIT A 
Stanley J. Preston 
II 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
December 20, 2013 
VL4 ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodrzif.!Smith 
Dear Mike and Gregg: 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
Thank you for your letter yesterday and settlement proposal. Stafford is ·willing to 
purchase the subject properties from Staffwood, including the Outlet Center property, on the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Stafford will pay the of sum $2,800,000 for the properties that 
were the subject of the bid process, which amount is $50,000 more than his last 
bid; 
2. The funds Woody has escrowed under the bid process will be 
returned to him at closing; 
3. In light of the holidays, the closing on Stafford's purchase will tal<e 
place thirty (30) days from the date the parties sign an agreement as to the terms 
of Stafford's purchase of the subject properties; 
4. The net proceeds from the sale of the subject properties will be 
divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the following obligations: 
a. Payment in full of Staffwood's loan from Wells Fargo Bank; 
Five Gateway Office Center 
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b. Payment to Smith Chevrolet of the funds it has advanced above 
its lease obligation on behalf of Staffwood to ensure adequate 
funds for Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations, which 
payment is pursuant to the parties' agreement as set forth in 
Section 10.4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement. These 
obligations include, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes, 
insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the Wells Fargo 
Bank loan. Exact amounts to be repaid to Smith Chevrolet shall 
be determined by means of an audit conducted by Staffwood's 
accolmtant, Kevin Oakey, but said amounts are anticipated to be 
in excess of $350,000; and 
c. Staffwood's retention of a mutually agreed amount as a reserve to 
enable Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations on its remaining 
properties. Stafford recommends that the retained sum should be 
$50,000 but in no event should the retained amount be less than 
$20,000. 
In addition, as you are aware, the sale of Staffwood' s Pocatello property \\~11 take place 
in the near future. Woody has agreed to the terms of the sale, but requested that the proceeds 
from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a settlement agreement. Stafford estimates 
that the net proceeds from this sale will be approximately $230,000. Assuming the sale takes 
place as planned, it is proposed that the net proceeds from this sale be distributed to the partners 
once an agreement is signed in writing regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid properties 
or, alternatively, that these funds be distributed simultaneously with the closing of Stafford's 
purchase of t.11e bid properties. 
Of course, once we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase of the bid properties, we 
will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties 
between the partners. Please let me know as soon as possible whether the foregoing is 
acceptable to your client. 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
December 20, 2013 
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Sincerely, 
cc: Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail) 
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail) 
EXHIBITB 
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE 
PO Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0385 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
801 532-1500,EL 
801 532-7543 FAX 
www.rqn.com 
January 13, 2014 
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 408 
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail 
Stanley J. Preston 
Preston & Scott 
178 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Smith v. Smith 
Dear Stan: 
Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 
20, 2013. 
PRovo orncE For purposes ?f certainty and clarification, we set forth below further detail 
86 North University Ave about OUT understandmg of the terms Of Settlement. Jn paragraph llO. 8 below, We 
suite 430 propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done 
Provo, Utah 
84601-4420 on a tax free basis. Woody's accountants believe that by treating the entire 
801 342_24oom transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interests in Sta:ffvvood, the 
301 375-8379 FAx parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax consequences. 
This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this provision is outside of 
the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that we do not require Stafford's 
agreement to paragraph no. 8. 
Also, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the Sta:ffvvood 
property, which we have set forth below. It does not matter to Woody which 
election Stafford makes of these two Property Sets. We do not see how the property 
can be divided any other way without resulting in joint or adjacent ownership of any 
properties, which may cause conflict or irritation in the future. 
Accordingly, the points of understanding are as follows: 
1. Stafford closes on the 3 bid properties at $2.8 million ("Closing"), which 
Closing is to be held within 30 days 1 of the date hereof. 
2. Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon 
finalizing this Agreement. 
1 You indicated that Stafford needed 30 days because of the holidays. Now that the holidays have 
passed, Woody is willing to close this in a much shorter time frame if Stafford is able to do so. 
Earlier closing will also save the parties additional interest. 
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3. All funds from the Closing shall go to the account Staf:fvvood, and shall be 
disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of Wells Fargo loan (assumed to be about 
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet 
and other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000.2 
Balance of funds from Closing shall be distributed equally to the partners. 
4. The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash 
as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or 
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by 
Stafford. 
Property Set A Property Set B 
*Snake River Landing Property Bellon Road Property 
Less: $400,000 Cash to Property B Blackfoot property 
Recipient 
**Pocatello property 
$400,000 Cash from 
Property A Recipient 
*Recipient A assumes and pays, and holds Recipient B harmless from, the 
$1. 9 million note and deed of trust pertaining to this property. 
**Recipient B shall receive all proceeds from the recent sale ofthis property. 
5. Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be 
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City ofldaho Falls in 
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity 
of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the Mite off. 
6. Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall 
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer 
of funds shall occur prior to Closing. 3 
7. The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing 
to Staffwood :from themselves or their respective entities, (b) ovving to them 
from Staffwood, and ( c) owing to each other ( except for (i) continuing 
obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the November 10, 2010 
Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties 
pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 
2 An audit of this amount would delay the Closing. Woody proposes to set this at $350,000 and be 
done with it. 
3 This avoids piecemeal settlement and motivates the parties to close. As mentioned in footnote l 
above, Woody is ready to close as soon as Stafford is able. 
Stanley l 1Jr,,,,1-r1n 
January 
3 
2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, 
Agreement. 
be released and settled by 
8. In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to 
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which 
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash 
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal 
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ovvnership interests in 
Staffwood. If the parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid 
properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth 
above. 
9. Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of 
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031 
like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action 
which increases the tax burden of the other party. 
10. Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, 
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in 
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon 
completion of the 1031 transaction. 
We look forward to hearing how Stafford would like to proceed. 
cc: Michael R. Carlston 
Woodruff Smith 
Hal Bennett 
Damian Smith 
1266871 
Sincerely, 
~UTNNEY& 
_,, Ji,./ . pence 
Greggory J. Savage 
~BEKER, P .C . 
. L----
EXHIBITC 
From: Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com> 
Sent: Thursday, 2014 1:26 PM 
To: 
Cc: 
Stanley Preston; "mcarlston@scmlaw.com' 
Michael Spence 
Subject: RE: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing 
We understand that Woody and the folks advising him generally agree with the computations in the Exhibit A you 
provided and it seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of 
issues that has been provided to us: 
1. Woody's return of his $292,500 deposit is irrelevant to this closing, because he is just receiving his own money 
back. Given the limited nature of the matters remaining for resolution, there seems to be no reason why he 
shouldn't get the deposit back immediately. We note that Stafford received a return of his earnest money the 
day after he elected to cease bidding. At this point, Woody's deposit is unnecessary because he is not obligated 
to provide funds to complete this deal. Therefore, we would like the deposit refunded immediately and Exhibit 
A amended to remove all reference to the deposit, because to an outsider (such as the IRS) looking at these 
documents, it appears that Woody is getting the full $688,867 out of this transaction, which he is not. 
2. We see that the computation presumes that Stafford will bring $2.8 million to the closing. Woody's tax 
professionals have advised both parties, in order to treat this as a sale Stafford will need to bring in the $2.8M 
and let it flow through the transaction. We realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange 
of the 3 bid properties under our Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution wherein 
he makes a contribution sufficient to get the 3 bid properties plus the Property B properties, and Woody gets 
Property A plus $395,967 (as adjusted for closing costs)'? This would allow Stafford to bring less than the $2.8 
million to the closing and would result in less taxes for both parties. Please advise whether Stafford is willing to 
consider this. 
3. Since the parties will be paying property taxes, utilities, etc., on a prospective basis, we don't see any need to 
keep money in Staffwood. Does this distribution provide for any money to remain in Staffwood? How much 
remains in the Staffwood account(s)? 
4. Woody is fine with Stafford managing the process relative to the gift of property to the City of Idaho Falls, but 
the agreement needs to provide that Woody receives the exact same attribution of the gift as Stafford, and that 
Woody's agreement is obtained prior to implementation. 
5. As we understand it, upon completion of this closing, the only matters remaining between the parties (other 
than Stafford's note to Woody as you have documented) are the following: 
a. Future dealings relating to SV Idaho and its eventual liquidation. Does Stafford claim Woody owes any 
money to SV Idaho or to Stafford relative to SV Idaho? If there is any disagreement on this, we would 
like to resolve it now. Also, there is the $500,000 to be written off. How does Stafford propose to deal 
with this between the partners? 
b. First right of refusal to buy the other's business. This hurts the marketability of both brothers' 
businesses, and is another potential matter for conflict in the fwture. Is Stafford willing to terminate this 
provision. 
c. Woody also requests that the one year non-hiring provision be terminated.· We would like to have 
employees at either partner's business free to be employed where they choose. 
6. Subject to the foregoing items and receipt of the following documents, Woody is prepared to close: 
Thanks. 
Gregg Savage 
a. Draft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement; 
b. Revised Exhibit A as requested above; 
Title on the Snake River 
d. Settlement Statement from the title 
From: Stanley Preston [mailto:sjp@prestonandscott.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 9:52 AM 
To: Michael Spence; Greggory Savage 
Cc: Mike Carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan M. Scott; Damian Smith 
Subject: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing 
Mike and Gregg, 
how disbursements are to 
Attached is a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown for the closing we have proposed. Obviously we don't yet 
know the title fees and closing costs that will need to added to this spreadsheet, but this is essentially what we propose 
will be Exhibit A to the Addendum to Escrow Instructions I sent you last week, and the reference to Exhibit Bin the 
Addendum will also be changed to reference this document as well. When do you anticipate getting back to us on our 
proposal. We would like to close this matter this week. Regards, Stan 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOlT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250 
SLC, UT 84101 
Tel.: 801-869-1620 
Fax: 801-869-1621 
DD: 801-869-1623 
sip@prestonandscott.com 
www.prestonandscott.com 
The Information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended 
recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information 
is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the 
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
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Stanley J. Preston 
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PRESTON & Scon 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
January 30, 2014 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMNJUNICATION 
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith 
Dear Mike and Gregg: 
Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the 
terms communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013 . Please be advised that 
Stafford is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined 
in your letter dated January 13, 2014, and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B. 
Enclosed is a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a Closing 
regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the transfer 
of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford, as well as drafts of the Special 
Warranty Deeds to be attached as Exhibits to the Addendum.. We have noted one change in the 
Special Warranty Deed to Woody where it states that it is further subject to a development lien, 
we are going to change this deed so that it specifically references the encumbrance in question. 
Also, Stafford is in the process of preparing Exhibit A to the Addendum, and we will forward 
these two exhibits to you as soon as they are available. In recognition of the parties' desire to 
accomplish this as soon as possible, Stafford proposes that this Closing take place tomorrow, 
Friday, January 31, at 2:00 p.m. 
The accountants are still in the process of advising our clients regarding whether to 
structure the transfer of the Staffwood properties as a sale or liquidation. Stafford anticipates 
that he will be provide a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody 
choose which way he wants to proceed. 
In the meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Setilement 
Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered by the 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621 
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enclosed Addendum. This settlement agreement will need to address at least the following 
issues: 
1. A mutual release of all claims between the parties. 
2. Woody's agreement to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless with 
respect to the deed of encumbering the Snake River Landing Property for which 
Sunn)'View, LLC, is the beneficiary. 
3. The parties' agreement that, upon the Closing pursuant to the Addendum, all 
debts, claims or obligations: (a) owing to Staffwood from Stafford and Woody 
and their respective entities; (b) owing to them from Staffwood; and ( c) owing to 
each other ( except for (i) continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 
3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing 
obligations of the parties pertaining to the vvindup of SV Idaho pursuant to 
Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and 
settled as part of this Settlement. 
4. The conveyance to the City ofldaho Falls of the seven acre plot west of the Snake 
River, with each partner receiving equal benefit of the tax write off. The gift of 
this property, however, must be made contingent upon the City building an 
appropriate park by a specified date. Stafford has worked on these arrangements 
and should see this through. Without this condition, the park may not be built in 
the parties' lifetimes. Stafford has been negotiating and working with the City 
and other parties in the planning of the park, and he has been working to bring in 
other major donor groups to ensure the park will be worthy of Staffwood's land 
donation and will be a true legacy. The parties will need to agree that Stafford 
should continue to take the lead in the planning and negotiations with the City. 
For these reasons, the timing of the donation should not be stipulated in the 
parties' settlement agreement 
5. The structure of the transaction as either a sale or a liquidation, with the resulting 
impact on the continuing existence of Staff\vood, as set forth in paragraphs 9 ai,d 
Michael Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
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10 of your January 13, 2014 letter, provided that Woody will make a decision on 
this issue within sixty days of Stafford presenting the options to Woody. 
6. A provision that the terms and conditions of the November 10, 2010 Settlement 
Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force 
and effect except as amended by the terms of the third settlement agreement. 
7. Inasmuch as Staffwood will not be liquidated at the Closing, and it will have 
some continuing obligations, the parties will agree to leave a nominal amount in 
the Staffwood account. 
Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed 
Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement 
agreement along the lines proposed herein. Once we are in agreement on these two points, I vvill 
begin preparing the settlement agreement. 
Sincerely, 
Encls. 
cc: Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail w!encls.) 
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail w!encls.) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail w/encls.) 
EXHIBIT 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Mike, 
Stanley Preston 
20141:05 AM 
'Michael 
Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>; Mike Carlston 
M. Scott; 'Damian Smith' 
Closing on Staffwood Properties 
Addendum to Escrow Instructions 02-20-14.docx; Analysis of Staffwood Sale and 
Distribution 02-20-14.xls; Release of Escrow Funds 02-20-14.docx 
In my email dated February 13, 2014, ! quoted from our prior written communications wherein our respective clients 
reached an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of other real 
property owned by Staffwood Partnership, as well as Woody express, written representation that he was willing to go 
forward with a Closing to effect the conveyance of the subject real property. 
It is, therefore, extremely disappointing that Woody would fail to follow through with his contractual obligation to 
complete this Closing in a timely manner and, instead, leave the country for an extended period of time, and thereby 
leave this important matter unconcluded. It is particularly troubling that Woody would do this without the courtesy of 
notifying us beforehand, and without making any provision that would allow you as his counsel to contact him. 
Please be advised that my client's patience has reached its limit, both as to Woody's unjustified delays and failure to 
complete the required Closing, as well as his repeated attempts to renegotiate the terms of the parties' prior 
agreements. Accordingly, we expect Woody to proceed with the Closing immediately upon his return from his trip, 
which we understand from your representation will be this coming Sunday. To accomplish this, we have scheduled the 
Closing for Tuesday, February 25, 2014, at 2:00 p.m., as outlined in the attached Addendum to Escrow Instructions, the 
Exhibit A to the Addendum, and the Release of Escrow Funds, which have been revised and prepared to accommodate 
Woody's request that the Closing make no reference to the return of his escrow funds. 
We believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement. If, however, you have any suggested 
changes to these documents please advise me immediately, provided that any such suggested changes are consistent 
with the terms of the parties1 agreement. Also, to the extent Woody desires to order title insurance on any of the 
properties that are being conveyed to him, please notify the Escrow Agent as soon as possible. Finally, please send me 
copies of the attached agreements with the required signatures from Woody, Woody1s wife, and the WDS Limited 
Partnership, by Monday, February 24, 2014. 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250 
SLC, UT 84101 
Tel.: 801-869-1620 
Fax: 801-869-1621 
DD: 801-869-1623 
sip@prestonandscott.com 
www.prestonandscott.com 
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The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended 
recipient. If the intended recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client 
communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information is prohibited. If you have received this 
communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the sender e-
mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
from: Michael Spence [mailto:mspence@RQN.COM] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 181 2014 4:10 PM 
To: Stanley Preston 
Subject: "Alias Smith & Jones" 
Stan, I have "heard" back from Woody's in house folks. Woody is out of the country and they/we don't expect to "hear 
or see" back from him until this coming Sunday, notwithstanding our efforts to contact him beforehand. If he is at the 
Olympics (which I seriously doubt), I hope he enjoys the 70 degree weather over there! Sorry. Mike 
Michael Spence I Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. I 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 I Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Direct: 801-323-3381 j Facsimile: 801-532-7543 J www.rqn.com 
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not 
intended to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting, 
marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be 
privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately. 
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individually his capacity as a general partner of SLS 1 successor to The 
SLS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general 
partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general partner of The 
WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general 
partnership ("Woody"). This Addendum is given by Stafford and Woody to TitleOne Title and 
Escrow Company ("Escrow Agent") to augment those certain instructions given to Escrow 
Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those certain Settlement 
Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 ("Initial Escrow Instruction") and 
additional property referred to herein ("Deeded Property"). 
In consideration of mutual covenants and agreements and the fulfillment of the instructions 
contained in this Addendum, the parties agree and instruct the Escrow Agent, as follows: 
1. Closing: The Closing shall be on Tuesday, February 25, 2014 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. Mountain 
Time at the office of the Escrow Agent located at 400 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho 
83402, or such other time and place as Stafford and Woody may agree, in writing delivered to 
Escrow Agent. At Closing, the following shall occur: 
A. Stafford shall deposit certified funds in the amounts required herein. 
B. The Escrow Agent shall eause to be recorded the deeds referenced in 
paragraph 3 hereof. 
C. The Escrow Agent shall obtain from Wells Fargo Bank, National Association 
and file or record terminations, releases, and deeds of re-conveyance sufficient 
and necessary to remove the liens and encumbrances listed on "Schedule 1," 
attached hereto, which Schedule shall be prepared by Escrow Agent. 
D. Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the stuns described in paragraph 2.C. 
hereof. 
E. Real property taxes and assessments shall not be apportioned between Woody 
and Stafford. Rather each parcel is being conveyed subject to accrued and 
accruing real property taxes and assessments. 
F. The Closing eosts shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership. Each party has the 
option of ordering and obtaining standard owner's policies of title insurance on 
any of the Deeded Property that is conveyed to such party pursuant to Closing, the 
premium for which shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership; provided, however, 
that each party shall immediately notify Escrow Agent of its decision to order any 
such title insurance so as not to delay Closing. Escrow Agent accepts 
responsibility for the condition of title only to the extent as established by in 
accordance with the policies of title insurance purchased as a part of the Closing. 
2. Collection of Funds and Disbursements: 
parties the following funds: 
A. Closing, accept additional funds Stafford the amount set forth in 
Exhibit A, attached hereto, together with a sum equal to one half (1/z) of the fees and 
costs charged by the Escrow Agent for Closing services. In addition Escrow Agent 
shall disburse to Wells Fargo Bank, National Association all sums necessary to 
satisfy the obligations and obtain the release of those liens and encumbrances listed 
on "Schedule 1 ", attached hereto, ·with a payout date of the amounts due to Wells 
Fargo Bank, National Association as of January 14, 2014, with Stafford responsible 
for paying any interest that has accrued since that date. 
B. At Closing, collect from Staffwood Partnership, or at its direction, all sums 
necessary to pay the premium cost of title insurance ordered by the parties 
relating to the Deeded Property. 
C. At Closing, disburse to WDS Limited Partnership the sum set forth in Exhibit 
A, attached hereto, less a sum equal to one half (1/z) of the fees and costs of 
Escrow Agent incurred in the Closing. 
3. Recording of Deeds: At Closing the Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded 
the following Special Warranty Deeds: 
to 
A. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit B", attached hereto, conveying to 
Woody the property commonly known as the Snake River Landing Property, subject to 
accrued and accruing real property taxes and assessments and to liens and encumbrances 
of record, including but not limited to that deed of trust recorded as instnunent number 
1176756 recorded February 2, 2005 with Staffurood Partnership as Grantor, 
AMERTITLE, INC, as Trustee and SUNNYVIEW LLC as beneficiary, which obligation 
Woody agrees to ass1une and pay and to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless 
therefrom. 
B. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit C", attached hereto, 
conveying to Stafford the properties located in Bonneville County, State ofidaho 
and commonly known as the RV Property, the Smith Chevrolet Property, the Bellin 
Road Property and the Pioneer Road Property, subject to accrued and accruing 
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record but free of the lien of Wells 
Fargo Bank, National Association as described in paragraph 2. A. hereof. 
C. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit D", attached hereto, 
conveying to Stafford the property located in Bingham County, State ofidaho and 
commonly known as the "Blackfoot Property," subject to accrued and accruing 
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record. 
4. The Parties' Prior Settlement Agreements: The terms and conditions of the November 
10, 2010 Settlement Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full 
force arid effect except as amended by the terms of this Addendum. 
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2014 
WoodruffD. Smith, general partner 
Dawn Smith, general partner 
WoodruffD. Smith, individually 
3 
of February, 20 
Stafford L. Smith, general partner 
Shelly Smith, general partner 
Stafford L. Smith, individually 
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Staffwood Property Division 
Sale of Property to Stafford 
Property Sale Analysis 
Cash paid to Staffwood 
Wells Note Balance Jan 14 
Adjustments to payoff+ -
Payment to Smith Chevrolet 
Title Insurance and Closing Costs 
amount to distribute 
RV 
Smith Chevrolet Building 
Woody's Automotive Building 
RV Building Land 
Vet Clinic Land 
Woody's Automotive Land 
Smith Chevrolet land 
Total Basis 
Sales Price 
Gain on sale of assets in Staffwood 
Cash Analysis 
Sale Proceeds 
2,800,000.00 
(858,066.00) 
(350,000.00) 
1,591,934.00 
Adjusted Basis 
371,040.40 
354,230.10 
232,596.78 
195,500.00 
134,421.31 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
1,327,788.59 
2,800,000.00 
1,472,211.41 
Cash distribution (will be reduced by TitleOne costs) 
Cash to Stafford from Woody to equalize A/B 
Proceeds from Pocatello 
Payment to Smith Chevrolet 
Net Cash at Closing 
Tax Basis of Property to Distribute at closing 
Team Automotive Pocatello Building 
Team Automotive Pocatello Land 
Note plus adjustments to equal $858,066 at date of closing. Stafford's responsibility 
Amount determined prior to closing 
less closing costs and insurance 
Stafford 
(2,800,000) 
795,967 
400,000 
239,843 
(1,364,190) 
Tax Basis 
152,782 
20,000 
Woody 
795,967 
(400,000) 
395,967 
Staffwood Smith Chev 
-239843 
350,000 
Team Automotive Blackfoot Building 
Team Automotive Blackfoot Land 
Bellin Road Land (Milligan) 
Land Snake River Parkway 
147,086 
10,000 
296,751 
Tax Basis 
488,559 
and as a 1 
successor to SLS Partnership and as a managing partner Staffwood Partnership, 
an Idaho general partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general 
partner of The WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an 
Idaho general partnership ("Woody") hereby instruct TitleOne Title and Escrow Company 
("Escrow Agent") as follows: 
Immediately upon completion of the Closing pursuant to the Addendum to 
Escrow and Closing Instructions ("Addendum") previously signed by Stafford 
and Woody, Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sum of $292,500 
previously deposited by Woody pursuant to those certain instructions given to 
Escrow Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staf:fwood Partnership and those 
certain Settlement Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 
("Initial Escrow Instruction"), less only the administrative costs of the Escrow 
Agent. 
The parties further aclmowledge that said disbursement of funds to Woody constitutes a return 
to Woody of his own funds that he had previously deposited with Escrow Agent pursuant to 
Initial Escrow Instruction, and that these are not new or additional funds that he is receiving 
pursuant to the Closing under the Addendum. 
DATED this day of February, 2014 
THE WDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
WoodruffD. Smith, general partner 
Dawn Smith, general partner 
WoodrnffD. Smith, individually 
DATED _ day February, 2014 
SLS 
Stafford L. Smith, general partner 
Shelly Smith, general partner 
Stafford L. Smith, individually 
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EXHIBITF 
Stanley J. Preston 
IJ 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
March 3, 2014 
• 
Direct Dial: 801-869-1623 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL 
Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith 
Dear Mike and Gregg: 
As previously explained in prior correspondence and electronic communications between 
us, it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered into an enforceable 
settlement agreement regarding: (1) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties for the sum of 
$2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain remaining Staffwood properties, whereby Woody will 
receive what has been designated as the Property Set A, and Stafford will receive Property Set B. 
We have reviewed applicable Idaho law on this issue and concluded it supports Stafford's 
position. 
Stafford has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement 
on these two primary issues and Stafford is, and has been since January 30, 2014, fully prepared 
to close on this settlement and meet all of his obligations related thereto. Stafford is suffering 
damage as a result of Woody's refusal to timely close on the agreed terms. At this point, unless 
this matter closes in the next few days, Stafford will be forced to use his own funds to pay off the 
liens and obligations owed by Staffwood to Wells Fargo Bank. 
Accordingly, Stafford hereby demands that the parties perfonu the required Closing on 
Thursday, March 6, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. pursuant to the terms set forth in my email to you dated 
February 20, 2014, and the documents attached thereto. If the Closing does not take place by 
March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties' 
settlement agreement and recover the damages Stafford has suffered. 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621 
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Michael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Savage 
March 3, 2014 
Page2 
Of course, if you have any suggested changes to the proposed Addendum to Escrow 
Instructions, the Analysis of Stafnvood Sale and Distribution, or the Release of Escrow Funds, 
that I emailed to you on February 20, 2014, we will certainly consider them, so long as they do 
not materially change the terms of the parties' agreement. 
Finally, this letter once again confirms Stafford's willingness post-Closing to endeavor to 
work with Woody to obtain the most mutually beneficial ta'<: treatment reasonably possible. 
According to Stafnvood's accountant, completing the transactions in accordance with the agreed 
terms provides the most favorable opportunity that will be available to minimize the tax 
obligations of the parties. Hopefully, your client will see the wisdom in getting this resolved at 
this time based on the terms to which the parties have agreed. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail.) 
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail) 
17 
Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276) 
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted) 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 869-1620 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 
MOTION TO SEAL COMPLAINT 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion to Seal Amended Complaint, as 
well as the Amended Complaint and Exhibits thereto that have been filed in this case, being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
The Amended Complaint filed on March I 2014 in this case is permanently sealed to 
preserve the confidential nature of the communications referenced in and uuu.vu,.,,u/ 
Amended Complaint, as well as the references to, and descriptions of, prior Settlement 
Agreements entered into between the parties, the terms of which are confidential. 
DATED this J1 day of March, 2014. 
By 
trict Court Judge 
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Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-03 85 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
V. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and 
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP, 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon J. Shindurling 
Pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Woodruff D. 
Smith respectfully moves the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Stafford 
L. Smith for failure to state a claim. In the alternative, Defendant moves the Court for an entry 
of summary judgment in Defendant's favor under Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Pursuant to Rule 7 (b )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff intends to file a 
memorandum in support of this Motion concurrently with the filing of this Motion. 
Defendant requests oral argument on this Motion. 
DATED this //Yl day of April, 2014. 
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RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
ichael W. Spence 
Greggory J. Sava 
Michael D. Ma 1eld 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-
Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff 
D. Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~day of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, First Class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
1277634 
Kara L. Pettit 
Michael R. Carlston 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 8410 I 
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Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
AttorneysfcJr Defendanl, Counterclaim-Plainliffand 
Third-Party Plaintiff WoodnfffD. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, ST A TE OF IDAHO 
ST AFFORD L. SMITH, ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
V. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and 
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
(With Jury Demand) 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
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Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith 
("Woody"), by and through counsel, hereby responds to the Complaint of Plaintiff Stafford L. 
Smith ("Stafford"). 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint and each and every claim for relief therein fail to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted against Woody. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Answering the numbered paragraphs of the Complaint, Woody answers and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit. 
3. Admit. 
4. Admit. 
5. Admit. 
6. Admit. 
7. Answering the allegations of Paragraph 7, Woody admits the allegations with 
respect to residency of Stafford and the location of the real properties involved in this matter. 
The allegations with respect to jurisdiction and venue state a legal conclusion to which no 
response is required. Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph 7. 
8. Admit. 
2 
9. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 9, Woody states that the 
referenced agreement is dated effective November 10, 2010, and speaks for itself To the extent 
that the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 9 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or 
inaccurately characterize the agreement, Woody denies the same. 
10. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 10, Woody states that the 
2010 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 10 arc inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
agreement, Woody denies the same. 
11. Denied. 
12. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 12, Woody admits that as a 
result of Stafford's actions and inactions he was forced to initiate that referenced litigation and 
states that documents on file in the litigation speak for themselves. To the extent that the 
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 12 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or 
inaccurately characterize the documents on file in the litigation, Woody denies the same. 
13. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 13, Woody states that 
documents on file in the litigation speak for themselves. To the extent that the allegations set 
fo1ih in Paragraph No. 13 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately 
characterize the documents on file in the litigation, Woody denies the same. Moreover, as set 
forth herein, it is clear that numerous disputes remain between Woody and Stafford. 
14. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 14, vVoody states that the 
2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
3 
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Paragraph No. 14 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
agreement, Woody denies the same. 
15. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 15, Woody states that the 
2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 15 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
agreement, Woody denies the same. 
16. Admit. 
17. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 17, Woody admits that 
RQN has acted as his attorneys and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph 17. 
18. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 18, Woody states that the 
2010 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 18 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
agreement, denies the same. 
19. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 19, Woody states that the 
2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements speak for themselves and, to the extent that the 
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 19 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or 
inaccurately characterize the agreements, denies the same. 
20. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 20, Woody admits that 
Stafford initiated the bid process contemplated by the Settlement Agreements with respect to the 
Bid Properties. V./ oody further admits that the Bid Properties had previously been leased to 
4 
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Smith Chevrolet Co. by Staffwood but denies the legal validity and enforceability of the leases. 
Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 20. 
21. Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations 
of Paragraph No. 21 and therefore denies the same. 
22. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 22, Woody states that the 
2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 22 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
agreement, denies the same. 
23. Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations 
of Paragraph No. 23 and therefore denies the same. Woody specifically denies that he owes any 
obligation to Stafford. 
24. Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations 
of Paragraph No. 24 and therefore denies the same. 
25. Admit. 
26. Woody denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 26 and affirmatively alleges that 
after he won the bidding process, he discovered several issues with the Bid Properties resulting 
from the actions and inactions of Stafford which resulted in Staffwood being unable to deliver 
marketable title to the Bid Properties as required by the Settlement Agreements. 
27. Answering the allegations of Paragraph No. 27, Woody admits that after the 
conclusion of the bid process it was discovered that Stafford had caused the Outlet Property to be 
titled in Smith Chevrolet Co. rather than Staffwood and in an effort to take advantage of his 
5 
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years of deception regarding title to the Outlet Property, Stafford refused, and continues to 
refuse, to cause title to the Outlet Property to be transferred to Staffwood and instead has leased 
the Outlet Property to a third-party to the benefit of Smith Chevrolet Co. Woody otherwise 
denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 27. 
28. Answering the allegations of Paragraph No. 28, Woody admits that the third 
member of Staffwood's managerial board resigned and that as a result Staffwood could not 
legally take any action not approved and agreed to by Stafford and Woody. Nonetheless, 
Stafford took, and continues to take, unauthorized, unilateral actions on behalf of Staffwood. 
Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 28. 
29. Admit. 
30. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 30, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 30 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
31. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 31, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 31 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
32. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 32, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
6 1 
No. are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
33. Answering the allegatio11s contained in F'aragraph No. 33, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set fo1ih in Paragraph 
No. 33 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
34. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 34, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 34 arc inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
35. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 35, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 35 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
36. Denied. 
37. Denied. 
38. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 38, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 38 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,· 
denies the same. 
7 
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39. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 39, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 39 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
40. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 40, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 40 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same. 
41. Denied 
42. Denied. 
43. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 43, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 43 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 43. 
44. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 44, Woody states that the 
referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph 
No. 44 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document, 
denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 44. 
45. Denied. 
46. Denied. 
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47. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 47, Woody states that the 
referenced documents speak for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 47 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 47. 
48. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 48, Woody states that the 
referenced documents speaks for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 48 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 48. 
49. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 49, Woody states that the 
referenced documents speaks for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in 
Paragraph No. 49 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the 
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 49. 
50. Denied. 
51. Denied. 
52. In response to Paragraph No. 52, Woody incorporates his responses to the 
foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
53. Denied. 
54. Denied. 
55. Denied. 
56. Denied. 
Denied. 
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58. Denied. 
59. Denied. 
60. Denied. 
61. Denied. 
62. Denied. 
63. Denied. 
64. In response to Paragraph No. 64, Woody ineorporates his responses to the 
foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
65. Denied. 
66. Denied. 
67. Denied. 
68. Denied. 
69. Denied. 
70. Denied. 
71. Denied. 
72. Denied. 
73. Denied. 
74. Denied. 
75. Denied. 
76. In response to Paragraph No. 76, Woody incorporates his responses to the 
foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
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77. In response to Paragraph No. 77, Woody states that this paragraph states a legal 
conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent Paragraph No. 77 makes any factual 
allegations, such allegations are denied. 
78. Denied. 
79. Denied. 
80. Denied. 
81. Denied. 
82. In response to Paragraph No. 82, Woody incorporates his responses to the 
foregoing paragraphs as though folly set forth herein. 
83. Denied. 
84. Denied. 
85. Denied. 
86. Denied. 
87. Denied. 
88. Woody denies the Prayer for Relief set f01ih in the Complaint. 
89. Each and every other allegation of the Complaint which has not been expressly 
admitted herein is denied. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of estoppel, !aches and/or 
unclean hands. 
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred by the lack of a meeting of the minds and/or a failure of 
consideration. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred because the agreements which he alleges are vague, 
ambiguous and lacking in material terms to be enforceable. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred, or the damages, if any, which he may be awarded should be 
reduced by his failure to mitigate his damages. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are subject to setoff or offset in favor of Woody arising out of, among 
other things, the facts set forth in Woody's Counterclaim. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred because of his own material breaches of contract and/or by 
his own actions and inactions. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Some or all of Stafford's claims are barred because he lacks standing to assert such 
claims. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Some or all of Stafford's claims are barred by his failure to join necessary and/or 
indispensable parties. 
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ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Stafford's claims are barred because of the parties' mutual and/or unilateral mistake(s) as 
described in the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint set forth below. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
Woody reserves the right to amend this Answer if, during the process of discovery or 
trial, he learns or discovers a basis for additional affirmative defenses. 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Counterclaim- and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith complains against 
Counterclaim-Defendant Stafford L. Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. 
and allege as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Counterclaim- and Third-Party Plaintiff WoodruffD. Smith ("Woody") is an 
individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
2. Counterclaim-Defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") is an individual residing 
in the State of Idaho. 
3. Woody and Stafford are brothers. 
4. Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Smith Chevrolet is 
currently wholly-owned by Stafford. 
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5. Third-Party Defendant Staffwood Partnership ("Staffwood") is a general 
partnership that is equally owned (50/50) by Woody and Stafford. Woody owns his interest in 
Staffwood through WDS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership with Woody and his 
wife as general partners. Stafford owns his interest in Staffwood through SLS Limited 
Partnership, an fdaho limited partnership with Stafford and his wife as general partners. 
Staffwood is named as nominal third-party defendant so that complete relief may be granted in 
this action. 
6. Pursuant to Rules 13(a), 13(b) and 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. Woody's and Stafford's father, Albon L. Smith, built a very successful 
automobile dealership business, Smith Chevrolet, in Southeastern Idaho. Prior to 1991, Stafford 
acquired the business from his father. 
8. In 1991, the dealership business, as a result of financial, ceonomic and 
management challenges, faced a potential involuntary liquidation of its assets due to the 
determination of its then lender, First Security Bank, not to renew its credit lines and the 
dealership's inability to obtain alternative financing. 
9. Woody owned and operated a successful used car dealership called Woody's 
Automotive and had demonstrated his ability to sell cars, run a profitable business, and gain the 
trust and confidence of customers and employees. Woody enjoyed and continues to enjoy a 
good reputation the community for honesty and integrity. 
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10. At the request of Stafford and his father, Woody agreed to join Stafford as an 
equal partner and assist Stafford in turning around the dealership business. Stafford and Woody 
made a presentation to First Security Bank in Boise, Idaho, explaining to the bank that Woody 
had joined Smith Chevrolet as half-owner, and asking for additional time before the financing 
was terminated. The bank eventually agreed to allow additional time as a result of Woody's 
entry into the business. At approximately the same time, Woody and Stafford entered into an 
agreement whereby Woody was to receive fifty percent ownership in the stock of Smith 
Chevrolet. Woody was the primary contact with the bank, reported daily to the bank concerning 
the progress of the business, and re-established the trust and confidence of the bank. Woody also 
caused Woody's Automotive to purchase overvalued inventory of Smith Chevrolet to bring cash 
into the business. As a result of Woody's efforts, the credit line was eventually restored. 
11. As part of the agreement for Woody to join Stafford as an equal partner in the 
dealership business, on or about January 22, 1998, Woody's Automotive was merged with Smith 
Chevrolet. 
12. Together Woody and Stafford turned around the dealership business and by 2010, 
Woody and Stafford jointly owned multiple dealership entities including Smith Chevrolet, Smith 
Ford, Smith Hyundai and Smith RV ( collectively the "Dealerships") along with several other 
business entities. Woody and Stafford, mostly through Staffwood, also jointly owned multiple 
parcels of real property. 
i3. For several years prior to and including 2010, Stafford had sole and exclusive 
control of the Dealerships and the other business entities including Staffwood. 
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14. Over the years, disputes arose between Woody and Stafford regarding Stafford's 
failure to transfer one-half of the stock of Smith Chevrolet to Woody immediately as called for 
by their agreement, failure to sell the stock at the agreed price per share, failure to involve 
Woody in management as required by the Stock Purchase Agreement, and failure to account to 
Woody for use of funds in the Dealerships, Staffwood and the other jointly owned companies. 
This resulted in Woody and Stafford each alleging various legal claims against the other. 
15. On November 10, 2010, Woody and Stafford, together with their respective 
counsel and other representatives, met for the purpose of trying to resolve the disputes between 
them. 
16. The November 101h meeting resulted in an agreement that was ultimately reduced 
to writing in the form of a Settlement Agreement (the "2010 Settlement Agreement"). The 2010 
Settlement Agreement is dated effective November 10, 2010, and was executed by Woody and 
Stafford individually and on behalf of their various business entities including without limitation 
Smith Chevrolet and Staffwood. Woody was to receive sole o-wnership of Smith Ford and Smith 
Hyundai, and Stafford was to receive sole ownership of Smith Chevrolet and Smith Honda. 
However, Stafford continued to manage Smith Ford and Smith Hyundai for approximately three 
months until the closing on the 2010 Settlement Agreement, which closed as of February 11, 
2011, at which time Woody assumed the management of these two dealerships. 
17. Among other things, Section 3 .12 of the 2010 Settlement Agreement identified 
four parcels ofreal property owned by Staffwood which either Woody or Stafford could 
purchase from Staffwood through a competitive bid process described in the agreement. The 
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four parcels of real property identified in 2010 Settlement Agreement are "(i) the Smith 
Chevrolet building and associated real property; (ii) the Smith Outlet Center building and 
associated real property; (iii) the Smith RV building and associated real prope1iy; and (iv) the 
Motor City property in Pocatello, Idaho." The successful bidder was to receive "marketable fee 
simple title" to the property. 
18. On numerous occasions, both prior and subsequent to execution of the 2010 
Settlement Agreement, Stafford, and those working at his direction, represented that the Smith 
Outlet Center property was owned by Staffwood. On infonnation and belief, Stafford, or those 
working at his direction, caused expenses associated with the Smith Outlet Center prope1iy, 
including property taxes, to be paid by Staffwood. 
19. Within months of the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, disputes arose 
between Woody and Stafford, and their respective related entities, regarding the terms, 
conditions and obligations of the 2010 Settlement Agreement and the parties' compliance with 
the 2010 Settlement Agreement as well as newly discovered matters outside the scope of the 
2010 Settlement Agreement. Among other things, Woody learned that during Stafford's 
management of Smith Ford and Smith Hyundai and virtually on the date of closing, and without 
notification to or consent from Woody, Stafford had unilaterally written approximately $450,000 
in various checks payable to the benefit of Stafford's entities. Stafford retained the ability to 
monitor Smith Ford's bank accounts after closing and had carefully timed the deposit of the 
several checks so that Woody would not be aware of the checks and so that he could not stop 
payment. Weeks after the closing, Woody first learned of these checks when Smith Ford's 
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checks would not clear because virtually all of the cash in Smith Ford's bank accounts had been 
paid to Stafford's benefit. These new disputes resulted in a lawsuit entitled Woodniff D. Smith, 
et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al. Case No. CV-11-1772 being filed in this court, alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and other claims against Stafford. Stafford defended by 
claiming that he was entitled under the 20 l O Settlement Agreement to take the cash out of Smith 
Ford. 
20. Ultimately Woody and Stafford, both of whom have been represented by the same 
counsel since at least 2010, together with their business entities including Smith Chevrolet and 
Staffwood entered into a second Settlement Agreement dated effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 
Settlement Agreement"). 
21. Among other things, the 2012 Settlement Agreement amended the 2010 
Settlement Agreement to require that Stafford initiate the bid process by February 2013. 
22. On February 7, 2013, Stafford initiated the bid process by making a bid to 
purchase "marketable title without financial liens and subject only easements and restrictions that 
are approved following receipt of a title commitment" to the "Smith Chevrolet Prope1iy," the 
"Smith RV Center Prope1iy," and the "Smith Chevrolet Outlet Center Property." 
23. The bidding process thereafter proceeded generally as set forth in the Settlement 
Agreements. 
24. On August 14, 2013, Douglas Nelson, who served as both Stafford's attorney and 
at Stafford's direction, Staffwood's attorney, sent an email 1o Woody's representatives regarding 
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the leases between Smith Chevrolet and Staffwood. On August 2i\ Woody's counsel 
responded by e-mail to Mr. Nelson's e-mail as follows: 
I have been asked to respond on Woody's behalf to your e-mail of August 14111 to 
Damian Smith and the Staffwood Board regarding leases on the three properties 
that are subject to an ongoing bidding process between Woody and Stafford. 
We agree that a discussion of a lease on the Smith Chevrolet prope1iy is 
unnecessary as Stafford has given notice that he is vacating that property. A 
discussion with respect to leases on the other two properties is similarly 
unnecessary. If Stafford wins the bidding process, he will have the certainty he is 
seemingly looking for and obviously will not need leases. If Woody wins the 
bidding process, he has no interest in a long tenn lease of either property to 
Stafford (and has no obligation to do so since the rental, lease tenn and lease 
renewal provisions of the Settlement Agreements apply only during the time that 
Staffwood own the properties) so discussion of leases on the Outlet or RV 
properties is also unnecessary. However, if Woody wins the bidding process, he 
would be willing to lease the RV property to Stafford for a short period sufficient 
for Stafford to relocate the RV business, subject to agreement on a new written 
lease which will include rent that is substantially higher than the Staffwood rent 
set by Mark Peterson. 
One aspect that the parties probably should discuss, however, is whether the 
separation of the properties can be done in a more tax advantageous way once the 
bidding process is complete. I understand that as it is currently, both parties will 
have to pay considerable tax on the sale of the properties from Staffwood to the 
eventual owner. If you wish to discuss any of this further, please feel free to 
contact me. 
25. Mr. Nelson did not respond to this e-mail and the bidding process thereafter 
continued in accordance with the Settlement Agreements. 
26. On October 17, 2013, Woody made a bid on the three properties. On October 28, 
2013, Stafford advised Woody and others that he would not continue bidding on "the Staffwood 
properties which are the subjects of the bidding process commenced February 7, 2013." Woody 
was therefore the successful bidder under the Settlement Agreements. 
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27. On November 1 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to Mr. Nelson, as counsel 
for Staffwood, indicating to Mr. Nelson that under the Settlement Agreements Staffwood was 
required to deliver "marketable fee simple title" to the properties and that under Idaho law 
"marketable title is one which is free and clear of all encumbrances." The letter further advised 
Mr. Nelson that Woody was concerned that Staffwood could not deliver such title by the 
required closing date of December 12, 2013, stating the following: 
1. Each of the Properties is cunently subject to a lease agreement 
with Smith Chevrolet Woody understands that Smith Chevrolet has given notice 
of its intent to tenninate the lease on the Smith Chevrolet Dealership property. 
Woody is unsure of the timing of the intended termination and needs confinnation 
the property will be vacated prior to closing. Likewise, confirmation is also 
needed that the leases on the Outlet and RV properties will also be tenninated and 
those properties vacated by December 12th. If this cannot happen, then new leases 
will need to be negotiated on terms acceptable to Woody. As noted in our e-mail 
to you on August 27, 2013: 
If Woody wins the bidding process, he has no interest in a long tenn lease of 
either property to Stafford (and has no obligation to do so since the rental, lease 
term and lease renewal provisions of the Settlement Agreements apply only 
during the time that Staffwood own the properties) so discussion of leases on the 
Outlet or RV prope1iies is also unnecessary. However, if Woody wins the 
bidding process, he would be willing to lease the RV property to Stafford for a 
short period sufficient for Stafford to relocate the RV business, subject to 
agreement on a new written lease which will include rent that is substantially 
higher than the Staffwood rent set by Mark Peterson. 
Please understand that Woody does not want to harm or inconvenience Stafford in 
any way. He will not put Stafford out on the street after closing. He is willing to 
lease the Properties to Stafford, so that Stafford has some assurance that he can 
maintain his business. 
2. Enclosed is the most recent version of a Preliminary Title 
Commitment from Alliance Title. According to the Commitment, the Outlet 
property ("Property C" in the Commitment) is titled in the name of Smith 
Chevrolet We understand that the Outlet property was conveyed in 2003 at a 
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time when the parties were in agreement that all investment property purchased 
by Smith Chevrolet would be owned by Staffwood. Stafford would appear not to 
dispute this, since he classified the Outlet property as Staffwood property both in 
the Settlement Agreements and in his bids. Woody needs confirmation that 
Staffwood will be able to deliver marketable title to this prope1iy at closing. 
3. Similarly, the Commitment indicates that a couple of small parcels 
associated with the Smith Chevrolet building (Property A, tracts 3 and 4 in the 
Commitment), are titled in Smith Chevrolet. These parcels were conveyed to 
Smith Chevrolet in 1979 and 1980. These parcels are located at the extreme west 
end of the Smith Chevrolet property. These parcels have always been used 
exclusively in connection with the Smith Chevrolet Dealership property and 
should have been included in the property owned by Staffwood. Woody needs 
confomation that Staffwood will be able to deliver marketable title to these 
parcels at closing. 
4. Exception 11 in this Commitment is a Development Agreement 
between Staffwood and Bonneville County. Woody will need appropriate 
assurances from Staffwood that all obligations of the property owner arising 
under the Development Agreement prior to closing have been perforn1ed and 
satisfied. 
5. The title company indicates that as of November 5, 2013, the total 
balance owing to Wells Fargo, secured at least in part by the Properties, is 
$897,624.40. Please confirn1 that Staffwood agrees with this balance and provide 
an explanation as to how Staffwood intends to satisfy the debt and eliminate 
exceptions 13-1 7 and 19-21 on the Commitment. 
6. Finally, Woody has learned that instead ofremoving the hydraulic 
lifts and the accompanying hydraulic fluid from the service area in the Smith 
Chevrolet building and obtaining the necessary governmental approvals 
associated with environmental clean-up sites, the area was covered over with 
concrete. Woody needs to know how Smith Chevrolet, the occupant and creator 
of any environmental issues, intends to remedy this and any other environmental 
issues on the Properties. Staffwood cannot convey marketable title to, and 
Woody cannot accept, any property that is or potentially may be, environmentally 
contaminated. 
28. The November I i 11 letter further stated the following: 
fast approaching closing date and other issues, we have been 
asked to suggest that Stafford and Woody, together with their attorneys and 
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accountants, meet as soon as possible, perhaps even by the end of this week. In 
addition to addressing the foregoing issues impacting marketable title, the 
following issues could also be included in the discussions: 
1. Pocatello property. Competing offers for the purchase of the property 
have been received and an agreement needs to be reached as to how to proceed. 
2. Avoidance of Unnecessary Taxes; Possible Dissolution of Staffwood. As 
suggested in our August 2i11 email, it seems to make no sense to structure the 
transaction as a sale of Staffwood property. This creates income tax for both 
partners. The parties should discuss other structures by which the tax is not 
generated, such as, for instance, a distribution in liquidation of the partners' 
interests in Staffwood. This would require an appraisal of the Staffwood 
properties other than the Properties, and adjustments made depending on the 
differential in values. A limited closing could then occur as to the non-Staffwood 
properties. 
3. New Lease of Smith Chevrolet and Smith RV. The parties can discuss 
and document lease terms mutually acceptable to Stafford and Woody to continue 
the lease of the Smith Chevrolet building (short tenn) and the RV property (can 
be longer term for Stafford's protection). 
4. Settlement of All Accounts. At the same time, we suggest that the 
accountants for both parties meet and discuss all other loans, credits, etc., to settle 
all outstanding claims. 
5. Agreement to Extend Closing if Necessary. If the parties can agree on 
these issues quickly, closing can occur on or before December 12111 • If we wish to 
use this closing as a way to accomplish a further separation of their interests, we 
may decide that it is mutually beneficial to extend the closing in order to 
accomplish this. 
29. Subsequent correspondence was exchanged by the attorneys for Woody and 
Stafford on at least November 20 and 26, 2013. The attorneys also met on November 25, 2013, 
to discuss the issues between Woody and Stafford. 
30. On December 4, 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to the Management Board 
the following: 
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As you know, we represent Woodruff Smith ("Woody") and this letter is 
written on his behalf As you also know, pursuant to the Settlement Agreements 
by and between Stafford Smith and Woody Smith and their associated entities 
(collectively, the "Settlement Agreements") Woody has won the bidding process 
to purchase three properties, two of which (the Smith Chevrolet and associated 
properties-"Property l," and the Smith RV property-"Property 2") are 
presently titled in Staffwood, and one of which (the Smith Outlet Center 
property-"Property 3 ") is shown by accounting records and tax returns as being 
owned by Staffwood, and was represented by Stafford to be owned by Staffwood 
in his bid documents, but is not yet titled in Staffwood (sometimes collectively, 
the "Properties"). Woody will purchase the Properties in the name of WDS 
Family Holdings, LLC (the "Purchaser"). Closing of the purchase is set for 
December 12, 2013, the deadline identified in the Settlement Agreements (the 
"Closing"). 
Under the Settlement Agreements and the applicable Idaho law, the 
Purchaser of the Properties is to receive "marketable fee simple title" to the 
Properties. As set forth in our letter dated November 12, 2013, addressed to 
Douglas Nelson, a copy of which is attached hereto, there are significant issues 
with Staffwood's ability to deliver "marketable fee simple title" to the Properties. 
We met with Stafford's counsel on November 25th to discuss potential resolution 
of these and other issues related to Staffwood, but Stafford's counsel have not 
responded in any meaningful way to our subsequent communications and 
requests. 
While we and Woody remain hopeful that a mutually acceptable 
resolution to all of the outstanding issues between Woody and Stafford can still be 
reached timely, we and Staffwood must at the same time proceed to comply with 
the Settlement Agreements. Accordingly, Woody requests formal, written and 
prompt board action by Staffwood as follows: 
1. That Woody and/or Stafford be empowered to execute, on behalf of 
Staffwood, statutory warranty deeds conveying to the Purchaser marketable fee 
simple title to Property 1 and Property 2 at Closing, free of any lease between 
Staffwood and previous tenants of such Properties; 
2. That from the proceeds of sale, the remaining balance of the Wells Fargo 
loan in the approximate amount of $897,000 be paid off upon, and in conjunction 
with, release of all deeds of trust, financing statements or other liens or 
encumbrances in favor of Wells Fargo on any Staffwood Properties including, 
without limitation, the Properties; 
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3. That Staffwood defend, indemnify and hold han11less the Purchaser 
against any environmental liabilities relating to the Properties, and that Staffwood 
further seek indemnification from Smith Chevrolet with respect to environmental 
liability created by Smith Chevrolet during its tenancy of Property 1; 
4. That each respective partner's share of the net proceeds at Closing be 
simultaneously paid to each such partner; 
5. That Staffwood make demand on Smith Chevrolet to convey marketable 
fee simple title of Property 3 to Staffwood, and to pursue a cause of action against 
Smith Chevrolet if such does not occur prior to or contemporaneously with 
Closing. Note that if Smith Chevrolet fails to timely deed Property 3 to 
Staffwood as demanded by Staffwood, Woody will proceed to close purchase of 
Property 1 and Prope1iy 2, and reserve the sum of $338,000 (which is the amount 
shown in Staffwood accounting records as having been paid by Staffwood for the 
purchase of Property 3) for later closing when Staffwood has secured the 
requested conveyance of Property 3; and 
6. That no Staffwood funds shall be authorized to pay any attorneys' fees 
incurred by the partners or Board members relating to any disputes between the 
partners relative to the Settlement Agreements or the matters referred to in these 
requested actions and resolutions. 
Each of the foregoing actions and resolutions is consistent with Staffwood's 
obligations to the Purchaser of the Properties. Woody supports each of the 
foregoing actions and requests that Stafford and/or Mark Peterson join him to 
approve the same. A failure to promptly take such actions will result in 
Staffwood (and certain members of its Board) incmTing unnecessary liabilities. 
Allowing such a result would be at least a breach of the fiduciary duties owed to 
Staffwood and will result in personal liability on the part of the other members of 
the Management Board. 
Finally, be advised that "Notice" is hereby given that if the Board action 
requested in this letter is not taken on or before December 11, 2013, Woody 
intends to file litigation seeking a declaratory judgment that Woody is entitled to 
the relief requested herein as well as pursuing other claims against Staffwood and 
the other members of the Management Board based on their present and past 
failures to act in the best interest of Staffwood. 
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31. Counsel Stafford sent e-mails or letters on December 6, 11, and 17, 2013, 
addressing the issues between the parties. In at least the December 6th and 11th correspondence, 
Stafford's counsel continued to assert that Staffwood did not own the Outlet Center Property. 
32. On December 9, 2013, Mark Peterson resigned from the Management Board. Mr 
Peterson stated that the reason he was resigning was "the allegations and demands of [the 
December 4th] letter." 
33. Stafford's counsel thereafter wrote a letter to Woody's counsel on December 20, 
2013. The first line of that letter suggested that it was part of an on-going correspondence aimed 
at settlement. It thanked Woody's counsel for their "letter yesterday and settlement proposal." 
The letter discussed Stafford's potential purchase of certain properties from Staffwood, but 
stated that Woody had "requested that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the 
parties reach a settlement agreement." The letter also clarified that it did not outline all of the 
terms for settlement between the parties: "we will expect to promptly receive your proposal for 
dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." (Emphasis added.) 
34. Woody's counsel responded to Stafford's counsel in a letter dated January 13, 
2014. The second line of that letter suggested that the December 20 letter was not sufficiently 
specific to constitute a valid offer to contract: "For purposes of certainty and clarification, we 
set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Emphasis 
added.) The January 13 letter also included proposals that were not part of the December 20 
letter. It stated, "we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way this transaction may be 
done on a tax free basis," and "[a]lso, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the 
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Staffwood property, which we have set forth below." Moreover, the letter suggested that any 
agreement would need further finalizing before it was valid: "Funds escrowed by Woody in the 
bid process shall be returned upon finalizing this Agreement." (Emphasis added.) The letter 
then outlined ten "points of understanding," most of which were terms that had not appeared at 
all in the December 20 letter, including the following: 
• "The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of 
property/cash as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose 
Property Set A or Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property 
Set not elected by Stafford .... " 
• "Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not 
be divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls 
in connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their 
capacity of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write 
off." 
• "Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party 
shall occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or 
transfer of funds shall occur prior to Closing." 
• "The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) 
owing to Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing 
to them from Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) 
continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the 
November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations 
of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 
of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and 
settled by this Agreement." 
• "In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree 
to discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which 
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash 
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal 
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests 
in Staffwood. If the parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the 
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bid properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set 
forth above." 
• Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of 
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 
1031 like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any 
action which increases the tax burden of the other party." 
• "Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, 
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in 
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon 
completion of the 1031 transaction." 
Thus, the January 13 letter contained at least 7 proposed material tenns that had not been spelled 
out in the December 20 letter and stated that any agreement would need finalizing. 
35. Stafford's counsel responded to the January 13 letter in a letter dated January 30, 
2014. The first line of that letter stated that "Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted 
Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms communicated in my letter to you dated December 
20, 2013." (Emphasis added.) The letter enclosed "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow 
Instructions to effect a Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid 
process, as well as the transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford." 
The letter also stated that Stafford had not yet decided on Woody's proposal of structuring the 
transfer of Staffwood properties as a liquidation and that "Stafford anticipates that he will be 
provide[ d] a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody choose which 
way he wants to proceed." 
36. The January 30th letter also emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third 
Settlement Agreement and explained that several material terms were up in the air: "ln the 
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meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement 
regarding this matter inasmuch as a number oftlte terms are not covered by tlte enclosed 
Addendum." (Emphasis added.) The letter outlined seven "issues" that would need to be 
addressed by a third Settlement Agreement and then stated, "Please let me know as soon as 
possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree 
that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed 
herein." Thus, the January 30 letter was clear in its call for a fonnalized, signed settlement 
agreement and in the need to resolve several outstanding terms. 
37. On February 5, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. It 
attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s] 
proposed." In response to a request from Woody's CFO that the deposit be released, Stafford's 
counsel declined the request on Stafford's behalf, stating, "Unfortunately, prior history indicates 
that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the 'devil is in the details.' 
(Emphasis added.) We have yet to receive a response we sent to you last Thursday so we don't 
know at this stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's email to me last 
Thursday that 'there will, indeed, be a material issue or two,' (that he is cautiously optimistic 
will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the escrow funds at this time." His 
e-mail further clarifies that no final agreement had been reached between the parties when he 
asks: "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our proposal[?]" 
38. Woody's counsel responded via email on February 6, 2014. That email stated 
that "it seems we are very close to agreement, but clarified that any agreement was "subject to 
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some clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." The email listed several such 
"issues" that needed clarifying or resolution before closing, one of which was that Woody would 
need to receive a "[ d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement." 
39. On February 20, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. 
Contrary to previous representations made by Stafford's counsel on February 5 that no 
agreement had been reached at that point, the email now contended that the parties had "reached 
an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of 
other real property owned by Staffwood partnerships." The email transmitted certain 
attachments and stated, "[w]e believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' 
agreement." The email did not, however, provide a draft third Settlement Agreement as 
requested by Woody's counsel in the February 6 email and January 30 letter, nor did it address 
with specificity the myriad outstanding issues outlined in the February 6 email. 
40. Stafford's counsel wrote Woody's counsel a letter dated March 3, 2014. The 
letter refers to the potential purchase of the bid properties and the division of other property as 
part of a single settlement agreement: "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the 
parties have entered into an e11forceable settlement agreement regarding: ( 1) Stafford's 
purchase of the bid properties for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain 
remaining Staffwood properties, ... " (Emphasis added.) The letter also referred to those tenns 
of the expected settlement agreement as "two primary issues": "Stafford has relied to his 
detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement on these two primary issues . .. 
(Emphasis added.) The letter then warned that "[i]f the Closing does not take place by March 
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6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties' settlement 
agreement." (Emphasis added.) It is notable that the March 3 letter refers to a single "settlement 
agreement" between the two parties and that it refers to the subject matter of those alleged 
agreements as "two primary issues." 
41. Correspondence was further exchanged between counsel on March 5 and 7, 2014. 
In the March i 11 con-espondence counsel for Stafford advised that this litigation had been 
initiated. 
42. After multiple requests from Woody, on March 25, 2014, Woody received a copy 
of a lease dated February 10, 2014, pursuant to which Smith Chevrolet leased the Outlet Property 
to Teton Volkswagen. 
43. Stafford also claims that he was required to pay-off a loan owed to Wells Fargo 
Bank by Staffwood. 
44. To the extent that Stafford took any action on behalf of Staffwood, he did so 
without the knowledge or consent of Woody and therefore had no authority to act on behalf of 
Staffwood. 
45. On information and belie±: payment of the Wells Fargo loan was done to benefit 
Stafford personally and/or resulted from actions taken by Stafford for his personal benefit and 
not for the benefit of Staffwood. 
46. In response to repeated requests for infomiation regarding the payoff of the Wells 
Fargo loan, Stafford's attorneys have advised "that Stafford did not have any substantive 
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communications or negotiations with Wells Fargo Bank regarding the Staffwood Loan and there 
are no such agreements or conespondence 1o provide." 
47. Stafford has caused other actions such as the preparation of tax returns to be taken 
on behalf of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent or approval of Woody. Many of these 
actions have been done in a way which benefit Stafford and are to the detriment of Woody. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory .Judgment-Lack of Binding Settlement Agreement) 
48. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
herein. 
49. Stafford contends that the communications between counsel for Woody and 
Stafford, described above and in Stafford's Amended Complaint, were sufficient to form two 
separate, legally binding and enforceable settlement agreements and that Woody breached such 
agreements. 
50. As set forth above in the referenced correspondence and given the long history of 
disputes between the parties, including the failure of an initial stock purchase agreement between 
the brothers in the 1990' s, as well as the failure of two subsequent settlement agreements to fully 
resolve the myriad disputes between the parties, the negotiations between the parties were an 
effort to reach a final, global or all-encompassing agreement that would once and for all separate 
Woody's and Stafford's business interests and resolve the remaining issues between them. 
Indeed, as asserted by Stafford's counsel, the "devil is in the details," and the parties had not yet 
agreement on those details. Both parties had learned that any settlement agreements 
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needed to be very carefully documented, considered, and then signed by both parties before any 
agreement was to be reached between the parties in view of the failure of three previous written 
agreements. 
51. Woody and Stafford failed to reach agreement on all material tenns of a 
settlement agreement and, for the at least the reasons set forth in support of Woody's Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, no legally binding and enforceable 
settlement agreement was fonned. 
52. Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that Woody and Stafford did 
not reach a legally binding and enforceable settlement agreement and that Woody and Stafford, 
and their respective business entities including Staffwood and Smith Chevrolet, remain subject to 
the 20 l O and 2012 Settlement Agreements ( except to the extent that those agreements may be 
rescinded or equitably refom1ed by the Court). 
53. Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as 
may be necessary to prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent 
with the Court's judicial declaration. 
herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment-Outlet Center Property) 
54. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
55. In November 2013 the parties learned that the Outlet Center Prope1iy was titled in 
the name of Smith Chevrolet. 
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56. Prior to this time the parties believed and acknowledged that the Outlet Center 
Property was owned by Staffwood. 
57. Both the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements acknowledged and represented 
that the Outlet Center Property was owned by Staffwood. 
58. On numerous occasions, Stafford, and those working at his direction, represented 
that the Smith Outlet Center property was owned by Staffwood. On information and belief: 
Stafford, or those working at his direction, caused expenses associated with the Outlet Center 
property, including property taxes, to be paid by Staffwood. 
59. Throughout the bidding process under the Settlement Agreement, the parties 
included and acknowledged the Outlet Center property as property owned by Staffwood. 
60. I( in fact, the Outlet Center property were owned by Smith Chevrolet, Stafford 
would not have needed to include the property in the bidding process which he initiated in 
February 2013. 
61. Staiiing in November 2013, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet refused to acknowledge 
Staffwood's ownership of the Outlet Center property in order to gain an advantage in their 
dealings with Woody. 
62. Pursuant to a lease dated February 10, 2014, pursuant to which Smith Chevrolet 
leased the Outlet Center prope1iy to Teton Volkswagen. Smith Chevrolet is not the owner of the 
Outlet Center property and had no right to lease the property to a third party. 
63. Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that the Outlet Center 
property is owned by Staffwood. Woody is further entitled to a judicial declaration that any 
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or other agreement entered into by Smith Chevrolet with respect to the Outlet Center 
property is invalid and null and void and any amounts paid to Smith Chevrolet under the 
aforementioned lease or otherwise must be immediately paid over to Staffwood. 
64. Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief as 
may be necessary to require Stafford and Smith Chevrolet to immediately transfer title to the 
Outlet Center property to Staffwood, to pay over any amounts rightfully due to Staffwood and to 
prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent with the Court's 
judicial declaration. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust) 
65. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
herein. 
66. As set forth herein, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have been unjustly enriched by 
their refusal to deliver title to the Outlet Center property to Staffwood and by exercising 
improper dominion and control over the property and the proceeds received therefrom. 
67. The Court should impose a constructive trust on the Outlet Center property and 
any proceeds derived therefrom. 
68. Woody and/or Staffwood are further entitled to a money judgment in an amount 
sufficient to disgorge Stafford and Smith Chevrolet of their unjustly obtained benefit and to 
compensate Woody and/or Staffwood in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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herein. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment-Marketable Title) 
65. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
66. Under the terms of the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements, the winner of the 
bidding process provided for in the agreements is to receive "marketable fee simple title" to the 
properties subject to the bid. 
67. "Marketable fee simple title" is one which is free and clear of all encumbrances. 
68. As the winner of the bidding process, Woody is entitled to receive "marketable 
fee simple title" to the three properties which were the subject of the bidding process, identified 
by Stafford as the following: "Smith Chevrolet Property," the "Smith RV Center Property," and 
the "Smith Chevrolet Outlet Center Property." 
69. As described above, particularly in Paragraph No. 27, the properties are subject to 
encumbrances. Due to the self-serving actions of Stafford, Staffwood has not been able to 
address such encumbrances (many of which benefit Stafford) and deliver "marketable fee simple 
title" to the properties as required by the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements. 
70. Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that he is entitled to receive 
title to the properties which were the subject of the bidding process free and clear of all 
encumbrances including without limitation those identified in Paragraph No. 27 above. 
71. Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as 
be necessary to require Stafford and Smith Chevrolet to remove encumbrances on the 
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properties including termination of the lease agreements in favor of Smith Chevrolet and to 
prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent with the Court's 
judicial declaration. 
herein. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
72. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
73. As set forth herein, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have materially breached the 
express terms of the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements. 
74. Under Idaho law, and inherent in the Settlement Agreements, are implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to 
every aspect of the contractual relationships between Woody and Stafford and their related 
business entities. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing prohibit Stafford and Smith 
Chevrolet from intentionally or purposefully doing anything which would impair, destroy or 
injure Woody's right to receive the fruits of the Settlement Agreements and the ordinary and 
reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the agreements. 
85. To comply with these covenants, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet had an obligation 
to act consistently with the Settlement Agreements' agreed common purposes and Woody's 
justified and reasonable expectations. 
86. Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have breached their covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing by engaging in at least the conduct set forth above. 
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87. As a direct result of Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's material breaches of the 
2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements, Woody has been damaged and is entitled to recover his 
actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as a result of Stafford's and 
Smith Chevrolet's material breaches, all in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgmcnt-Staffords Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood) 
88. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
herein. 
89. Woody and Stafford equally own Staffwood. No action may therefore be taken 
on behalf of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent and approval of both Woody and 
Stafford. 
90. As described herein, Stafford has taken, and continues to take, actions on behalf 
of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent or approval of Woody. 
91. Many of the actions unilaterally taken by Stafford are for his own benefit and to 
the detriment of Woody. 
92. Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that any unilateral actions 
taken by Stafford on behalf of Staffwood are invalid and null and void. Woody is further entitled 
to a declaration that to the extent that such unilateral actions have damaged Staffwood or Woody, 
Stafford is personally liable for such damages. 
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93. Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief as 
may be necessary to prohibit Stafford from taking any action on behalf of Staffwood without 
Woody's knowledge, consent and approval. 
herein. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
94. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
95. By reason of the duties created by the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements and 
otherwise, Stafford owed Woody and Staffwood a fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing for 
Stafford's own benefit or the benefit of Smith Chevrolet, and to protect the interests of Woody 
and Staffwood. 
96. As set forth herein, Stafford materially breached his fiduciary duties. 
97. Smith Chevrolet aided and abetted, and benefitted from, Stafford's breaches of his 
fiduciary duty. 
98. As a direct result of Stafford's material breaches of his fiduciary duties and Smith 
Chevrolet's aiding and abetting such breaches, Woody and/or Staffwood have been damaged and 
are entitled to recover their actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as 
a result of Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's actions and inactions, all in an amount to be proven 
at trial. 
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herein. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Mutual Mistake) 
99. Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully 
I 00. Staffwood's ownership of the Outlet Center property was a material assumption 
and understanding underlying the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements. 
101. In November 2013 the parties learned that the Outlet Center property was titled in 
the name of Smith Chevrolet. 
102. As described herein, since November 2013, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have 
taken the position that Staffwood does not own the Outlet Center property and Smith Chevrolet 
has refused to transfer title to the property to Staffwood. 
103. As further described herein, Woody disputes Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's 
claim to ownership of the Outlet Center property. u: however, the Court determines the Outlet 
Center property is owned by Smith Chevrolet, such a detern1ination will establish that parties 
relied on a mutual mistake of a material fact fundamental to the 2010 and 2012 Settlement 
Agreements. 
I 04. As a result of such mutual mistake, the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements 
must be rescinded or otherwise equitably reformed. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Woody prays for judgment against Stafford and/or Smith Chevrolet on at 
grounds stated for as follow: 
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1. On the First, Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action, for entry ofjudicial 
declarations and preliminary and permanent injunctions as set forth therein. 
2. On the Third Cause of Action, for imposition of constructive trust and entry of a 
money judgment in an amount to disgorge Stafford and Smith Chevrolet of their unjustly 
obtained benefit and to compensate Woody and/or Staffwood in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. On the Fifth and Seventh Causes of Action, for entry of a money judgment 
against Stafford and Smith Chevrolet sufficient to compensate Woody and/or Staftwood for their 
actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as a result of Stafford's and 
Smith Chevrolet's actions and inactions, all in an amount to be proven at trial. 
4. On the Seventh Cause of Action, if a mutual mistake is found, for an order 
rescinding or otherwise equitably reforming the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements. 
5. For interest, attorneys' fees and costs, including, without limitation expert fees, 
forensic accounting fees, consulting fees, and other costs and expenses, to the fullest extent 
allowed by law, including, without limitation, as allowed by Idaho Code 12-120(3 ), 12-121, 48-
608, and Rule 54( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. For other relief: in equity or at law, which the Court finds appropriate under the 
circumstances presented herein. 
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JURY DEMAND 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Woody demands a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right by a jury. 
DA TED this ///t day of April, 2014. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Michael W. Spene 
Greggory J. Savage / 
Michael D. Mayfield 
Attorneysfr>r Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaint[ff 
and Third-Party Plaint!ff Woodruff D. Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _j//f day of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT was mailed, First Class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kara L. Pettit 
Michael R. Carlston 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Stanley J. Preston 
PRESTON & SCOTT 
Five Gateway Office Center 
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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L 
Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending) 
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Plaintf[f Woodruff D. Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO 
STAFFORD L. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
V. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
WOODRUFF D. SMITH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and 
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-2014-1434 
Judge Jon Shindurling 
Pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 6) and Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party PlaintiffWoodruffD. Smith ("Woody"), by 
and through counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Supp011 of Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The key question in this motion is whether the parties fom1ed valid contracts based on 
letter and e-mails exchanged between counsel for the parties. As set forth below, the 
communications were nothing more than a series of back-and-forth negotiations with an eye 
toward a settlement agreement that was never reached. Plaintiff Stafford Smith ("Stafford") 
seeks to enforce two alleged "contracts" based on those back-and-forth negotiations, but for at 
least three reasons Stafford's own Amended Complaint is fatal to his claims. First, the Amended 
Complaint establishes that the parties have a long history of disputes and that the goal of the 
negotiations between the parties was an all-encompassing settlement agreement, not a series of 
piecemeal contracts. Second, the Amended Complaint establishes that there was never an 
agreement as to all of the material tem1s of any contract and that, instead, the communications 
between the parties were simply a series of back-and-forth negotiations with no valid offer or 
acceptance. And third, there was a mutual mistake about the ownership of one of the properties 
at issue that would render any contract unenforceable. Stafford is simply seeking to enforce 
agreements to agree and the "contracts" he alleges are merely some tem1s of a settlement 
agreement that was never reached. Stafford's contract claims fail and his Amended Complaint 
should be dismissed. 
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BACKGROUND 
This action is about a failed attempt by Stafford and Woody to settle a prolonged dispute 
for the third and what was hoped to be, final time. The parties are brothers who have had various 
business relationships over the years. (Am. Comp!. ,i,i 6 & 8.) Over the years, disputes arose 
between the parties about the management and ownership interests in certain businesses. These 
disputes came to a head in approximately 2010. (Id. ,i 8.) The parties asserted legal claims 
against one another and later entered a Settlement Agreement dated effective as of November l 0, 
2010 (the "2010 Settlement Agreement".). (Id. ,i,i 8-9.) The 2010 Settlement Agreement 
divided various car dealerships and other businesses between the parties and included a mutual 
release of all claims. (Id ,i 9.) But after the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement in 
February 2011, another lawsuit was filed and it became apparent that the parties still had disputes 
over several issues both related to the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise. (Id. ,i,i 11-13.) 
Effective as of July 5, 2012, the parties entered a second settlement agreement (the "2012 
Settlement Agreement."). (Id. ,i 14.) This second settlement agreement purported to settle all 
claims and disputes between the parties and their various business entities and also included a 
mutual release of claims. (Id. ili! 14-15.) The lawsuit was also dismissed with prejudice in light 
of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. (Id. ,r 15.) But like the 2010 Settlement Agreement, the 
2012 Settlement Agreement was not the end of the story. 
Disputes arose between the parties again in 2013. (Id i! 26.) These disputes related to 
the business interests that the parties shared, and included issues about the bidding process to 
purchase three properties owned by Staffwood, the general partnership that is co-owned between 
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the parties, and division of other properties owned by Staffwood. (Id ,ri! 4 , 20-1 One of the 
three properties that Woody won the right to purchase was known as the Outlet Property, but an 
issue arose as to whether that property was even owned by Staffwood. 1 (Id ,r 27.) Other issues 
came to light such as environmental concerns on real property leased from Staffwood and 
operated by Stafford's dealership, third-party defendant Smith Chevrolet Co, Inc. 
Several communications between the parties and their counsel are relevant to the current 
lawsuit and this motion to dismiss. Stafford included those communications, or references 
thereto, in his Amended Complaint and attached some of them thereto. The Court may therefore 
consider them without converting this motion to a motion for summary judgment. Idaho Wool 
Growers Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 ldaho 716, 721, 302 P.3d 341, 346 (Idaho 2012) (considering 
on a 12(b)(6) motion a letter that plaintiff had incorporated into the complaint); Stewart v. 
Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968) ("Where other matters are 
incorporated by reference in the pleadings, the comi may properly consider such matters in 
passing on the [12(b)(6)] motion ... "). Those communications include: (1) a December 20, 
2013 letter from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "December 20 letter"); (2) a January 
13, 2014 letter from Woody's counsel to Stafford's counsel (the "January 13 letter"); (3) a 
January 30, 2014 letter from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "January 30 letter"); (4) 
emails between Stafford's counsel and Woody's counsel on February 5 and 6, 2014 (the 
"February 5 email" and "February 6 email"); (5) a February 20, 2014 email from Stafford's 
1 Stafford contends that the Outlet Property is owned by Smith Chevrolet and in February 2014 he caused the Outlet 
Property to be leased to a third-party. 
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counsel to Woody's counsel (the "February 20 email"); and (6) a March 2014 letter from 
Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "March 3 letter"). These communications make 
clear that, instead of forming two discrete contracts about the purchase and division of 
properties, the parties were working to resolve their disputes through an all-encompassing 
settlement agreement that was never reached. This memorandum describes each communication 
in turn. 
A. The December 20, 2013 Letter 
Stafford's counsel Stanley Preston wrote a letter to Defendant's counsel on December 20, 
2013, which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit A 
The first line of that letter suggested that it was part of an on-going correspondence aimed at 
settlement. It thanked Woody's counsel for their "letter yesterday and settlement proposal." 
(Id.) The letter discussed Stafford's potential purchase of certain properties from Staflwood, but 
stated that Woody had "requested that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the 
parties reach a settlement agreement." (Id.) The letter also clarified that it did not outline all of 
the terms for settlement between the parties: "we will expect to promptly receive your proposal 
for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." (Id. (emphasis added).) 
B. The January 13, 2014 Letter 
Woody's counsel responded to Stafford's counsel in a letter dated January 13, 2014, 
which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit B. The 
second line of that letter suggested that the December 20 letter was not sufficiently specific to 
constitute a valid offer to contract: "For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth 
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below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Am. Com pl. Ex. B 
( emphasis added).) The January 13 letter also included proposals that were not part of the 
December 20 Jetter. It stated, "we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way this 
transaction may be done on a tax free basis," and "[a]lso, as requested, we propose a division of 
the balance of the Staffwood property, which we have set forth below." (Id.) Moreover, the 
letter suggested that any agreement would need further finalizing before it was valid: "Funds 
escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing this Agreement." (Id. 
( emphasis added).) The letter then outlmed ten "points of understanding," most of which were 
terms that had not appeared at all in the December 20 letter, including the following: 
• "The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of prope1iy/cash as 
set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or 
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by Stafford. 
" 
• "Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be 
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in 
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity of 
partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off" 
• "Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall 
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer of 
funds shall occur prior to Closing." 
• "The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing to 
Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them from 
Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of 
Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, 
and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho 
pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be 
released and settled by this Agreement." 
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• "In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to 
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which 
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and 
property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of 
Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. If the 
parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid prope1iies and the 
subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above." 
• Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of calendar 
year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031 like-kind 
exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action which 
increases the tax burden of the other party." 
• "Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, unless 
it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in paragraph no. 9 
above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon completion of the 1031 
transaction." 
Thus, the January 13 letter contained at least 7 proposed material terms that had not been spelled 
out in the December 20 letter and stated that any agreement would need finalizing. 
C. The January 30, 2014 Letter 
Stafford's counsel responded to the January 13 letter in a letter dated January 30, 2014, 
which is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit D. The first line of that letter stated that 
"Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms 
communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013." (Am. Compl. Ex. D (emphasis 
added).) The letter enclosed "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a 
Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the 
transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford." (Id) The letter also stated 
that Stafford had not yet decided on Woody's proposal of structuring the transfer of Staffwood 
properties as a liquidation and that "Stafford anticipates that he will be provide[ d] a description 
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of these two options in the near future and then let Woody choose which way he wants to 
proceed." (Id.) 
The letter also emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third Settlement Agreement 
and explained that several material terms were up in the air: "In the meantime, the parties will 
still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as 
a number of the terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Id (emphasis added).) 
The letter outlined seven "issues" that would need to be addressed by a third Settlement 
Agreement and then stated, "Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested 
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and 
sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id.) Thus, the January 30 
letter was clear in its call for a fonnalized, signed settlement agreement and in the need to 
resolve several outstanding terms. 
D. The February 5 and 6, 2014 Emails 
Stafford also made emails from early February a part of the Amended Complaint and 
attached them thereto as Exhibit C. The first email was from Stafford's counsel to Woody's 
counsel on February 5, 2014. It attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown of the 
closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) On February 5, 2014, Stafford's 
counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. It attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial 
breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." In response to a request from Woody's 
CFO that the deposit be released, Stafford's counsel declined the request on Stafford's behalf, 
stating, "Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between 
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these parties, the 'devil is in the details.' We have yet to receive a response we sent to you last 
Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's 
email to me last Thursday that 'there will, indeed, be a material issue or two,' (that he is 
cautiously optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the escrow 
funds at this time." His e-mail further clarifies that no final agreement had been reached 
between the parties when he asks: "[ w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our 
proposal[?]" (Id. (emphasis added).) 
Woody's counsel responded via email on February 6, 2014. That email stated that "it 
seems we are very close to agreement," but clarified that any agreement was "subject to some 
clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." (Id.) The email listed several such 
"issues" that needed clarifying or resolution before closing, one of which was that Woody would 
need to receive a "[ d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement." (Id.) 
E. February 20, 2014 Email 
On February 20, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel that is 
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit E. The email 
contended that the parties had "reached an agreement as to the tem1s for Stafford's purchase of 
the bid prope1iies and the distribution of other real property owned by Staffwood partnerships." 
(Am. Compl. Ex. E.) The email transmitted certain attachments and stated, "[w]e believe these 
attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement." (/d.) The email did not, 
however, provide a draft third Settlement Agreement as requested in the February 6 email and 
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January 30 letter, nor did it address with specificity the myriad outstanding issues outlined in the 
February 6 email. 
F. The March 3, 2014 Letter 
Stafford's counsel wrote Woody's counsel a letter dated March 3, 2014, which was 
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit F. Importantly, the 
letter refers to the potential purchase of the bid properties and the division of other property as 
part of a single settlement agreement: "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the 
parties have entered into an enforceable settlement agreement regarding: (I) Stafford's 
purchase of the bid properties for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain 
remaining Staffwood properties, ... " (Am. Compl. Ex. F (emphasis added).) The letter also 
referred to those terms of the expected settlement agreement as "two primary issues": "Stafford 
has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement on these two 
primary issues . ... " (Id (emphasis added).) The letter then warned that "[i]f the Closing does 
not take place by March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce 
the parties' settlement agreement." (Id ( emphasis added).) It is notable that the March 3 letter 
refers to a single "settlement agreement" between the two parties instead of the two distinct 
agreements that are alleged in the Amended Complaint and that it refers to the subject matter of 
those alleged agreements as "two primary issues." 
ARGUMENT 
This key issue in this motion is whether the parties reached an enforceable contract or 
whether their communications were simply continued settlement negotiations and counter 
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proposals. The "general rules for the formation of a binding contract" are straightforward. C.H. 
Leavell and Co. v. Grafe and Assocs., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873, 877 (Idaho 1966). To 
form a valid contract, "[t]he minds of the parties must meet as to all of its tenns, and, if any 
portion of the proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract." Id 
(emphasis added). To be enforceable, "[a] contract must be complete, definite, and certain in all 
its material terms." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532, 538 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2009) (emphasis added). A valid acceptance is also required to form an enforceable 
contract. But"[ a ]n acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and 
unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." Leavell, 90 
Idaho at 511 (emphasis added). "An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer is a 
rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in turn be accepted by the offeror 
in order to constitute a binding contract." Id at 511-12; see also Gyurkey v. Babier, 65 I P .2d 
928,931 (Idaho 1982) (acceptance must be unconditional of the terms of the offer or it is a 
rejection and counteroffer). Put simply, a contract is not valid if (1) it is not certain as to all 
material tenns or if (2) it is the subject of continued negotiations and proposals. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6), "the question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support 
of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Sec. 
Bureau, 128 Idaho 653,656,917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Idaho 1996). If not, the motion to dismiss 
should be granted. Summary judgment, on the other hand, is warranted where "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
" I.R.C.P. 56(c). In making a summary judgment determination, "[a]ll disputed facts are 
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Kiebert v. Goss, 
144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (Idaho 2007). 
Stafford's Amended Complaint should be dismissed in light of these standards for several 
reasons. Stafford suggests that the parties' back-and-forth negotiations resulted in two distinct 
contracts, calling one the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" and the other the "Division of 
Staffwood Properties Agreement." But the reality is that those two "agreements" were simply 
parts of a broad settlement agreement that the parties were hoping to reach. Settlement was at 
the very core of the parties' negotiations and the purchase of the bid properties and division of 
other properties were just pieces of a larger puzzle, a puzzle which in two prior attempts the 
parties had not been able to solve. The parties had not reached an agreement on other material 
terms related to those portions of the settlement agreement and various other material terms 
related to settlement generally. Instead, as Stafford's Amended Complaint establishes, the 
communications between the parties were "nothing more than a series offers and counter offers 
which never ripened into a binding contract." Id at 513. 
This memorandum divides the arguments as to why a binding agreement was not reached 
by the parties into four parts. First, it explains why the parties' negotiations about a purchase of 
the Bid Properties did not fonn a contract. Second, it explains why the parties' negotiations 
about division of other Staffwood properties did not fonn a contract. Third, it explains why 
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Stafford fails to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, it explains why Stafford fails to state a claim of promissory estoppel. 
I. The Parties Never Formed a "Bid Properties Purchase" Contract. 
Stafford contends that the parties entered into an enforceable "Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement," but that contention suffers at least three fatal flaws: (1) purchase of the Bid 
Properties was simply part of a potential settlement agreement; (2) the communications were 
nothing more than ongoing negotiations and counter proposals; and (3) there was a mutual 
mistake about ownership of the Outlet Property. 
A. Terms About the Purchase of the Bid Properties Were Simply Part of a 
Broad Contemplated Settlement Agreement. 
Stafford overlooks the fact that the main goal of the parties in negotiating was to resolve 
their ongoing dispute. As such, their purported "agreement" about the bid properties was just 
one piece of the puzzle. There is no document called the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement," 
Stafford created that title out of whole cloth. Instead, there was simply a series of back and forth 
communications that discuss the bid properties among other issues-all with an eye toward an 
all-encompassing settlement. 
That the terms about bid properties and dissolution were simply parts of a broad putative 
settlement agreement is established by the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint, for 
example, makes clear that the negotiations between the two pai1ies came on the heels of two 
previous settlement attempts, that there was "a new dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant," 
Compl. , 27), and that the communications the parties was effort to negotiate 
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a resolution of this dispute." (Am. Comp I. i! 29.) The January 30 letter that Stafford made a part 
of the Amended Complaint also made elear that "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a 
third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not 
eovered." (Arn. Comp 1. Ex. D.) That the parties still "need[ ed] to prepare and sign a third 
Settlement Agreement, after the time in whieh Stafford contends a "Bid Properties Purchase 
Agreement" was fom1ed, establishes that the principle aim of the negotiations was to reach a 
settlement agreement and that no such contract had been formed. 
The March 3 letter further establishes that settlement was at the heart of the negotiations. 
That letter stated that "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered 
into an enforceable settlement agreement regarding: (I) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties 
for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of ce1iain remaining Staffwood properties." 
(Am. Cornpl. Ex. F.) Notably, the letter refers to a single "settlement agreement," not two 
discrete contracts as suggested in the Amended Complaint. That letter also cautions, "[i]f the 
Closing does not take place by March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue 
Woody to enforce the parties' settlement agreement." (Id. (emphasis added).) The parties were 
trying to reach a global settlement agreement, and proposed terms about bid properties and 
division of properties were simply parts of that potential agreement. 
B. There Was No Offer or Acceptance Because Each Communication 
Contained Clarifications and Counterproposals and there Was No Meeting 
of the Minds as to Several Material Terms. 
Stafford's claims about a "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" fail for another reason: 
was never an or "acceptance" of sueh an agreement. It is axiomatic that "[ajn offer 
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... must be so complete that upon acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the 
terms necessary to determine whether the contract has been performed or not" and that "[a]n 
acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with tlte offer and unconditional, and 
must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 (emphasis 
added). Stafford suggests that Woody accepted the terms of his December 20 ofter, but the 
reality is that Stafford's December 20, 2013 letter was not a valid offer and was followed by a 
series of counter proposals and clarifications that refute any notion of acceptance. 
1. January 13 Letter 
Woody's January 13, 2014 letter, which is Stafford's primary basis for arguing there was 
an acceptance, made clear from the outset that the December 20, 2013 letter was not sufficiently 
detailed to constitute a valid "offer." It stated that "[f]or purposes of certainty and clarification, 
we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Am. 
Cornpl. Ex. B.) That statement alone establishes that the January 13 letter was not an acceptance 
because the December 20 "offer" was not sufficiently clear. Instead of an acceptance, the 
January 13 letter was just another step in the negotiating process. 
In addition to providing "further detail" for purposes of "certainty and clarification," the 
January 13, 2014 letter also could not constitute an acceptance because it proposed new terms. 
First, it stated "[i]n paragraph no. 8 below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way 
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis." (Id ( emphasis added).) Even though the 
letter states that Stafford's assent to that term was not required, that proposal "introduce[ d] a[] 
new tem1[]"to the agreement and, therefore, negated any notion of acceptance. Leavell, 90 Idaho 
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at 511. The January 13 letter included additional proposals as well. It stated, "[a]lso, ... we 
propose a division of the balance of the Staffwood property," (Id), and then the letter outlined 
ten "points of understanding" in which Woody clarified and proposed various terms that were 
not included in Stafford's alleged "offer." The second point of understanding, for example, 
proposed that "[t]unds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing 
this Agreement." (Id) That provision alone makes clear that the January 13 letter was not an 
outright acceptance and that the agreement was not yet final. The other myriad clarifications and 
proposals also made clear that the January 13 letter was a far cry from an acceptance. Instead, it 
was simply another communication in a series of negotiations and proposals aimed at reaching 
an all-encompassing settlement agreement. 
2. January 30 Letter 
The January 30 letter also failed to constitute an acceptance of an enforceable contract. 
That letter enclosed "a draft Addendum" related to the purchase of the bid properties and asked 
Woody's counsel if they had "any suggested changes" to it. (Am. Comp I. Ex. D.) More 
importantly, that letter made clear the "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third 
Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of terms are not covered by 
the enclosed Addendum." (Id) The letter then outlined several proposals for the settlement 
agreement and asked whether Woody "would agree that the parties should prepare and sign a 
third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id) Importantly, one of the 
factors that is "helpful in detennining the intention of the parties" to contract is "whether the 
negotiations themseives indicate that a written draft is contemplated at the final conclusion of the 
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negotiations. Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 898. The January 30 letter is conclusive that the parties 
contemplated such a formalized agreement and it also put forward a series of counter proposals 
that showed that the parties had not yet had a meeting of the minds as to all material terms. 
3. February 5 and 6 Emails 
The February 5 email further established that no enforceable contract had been formed 
about a purchase of the Bid Properties. Referring to the closing for the purchase of the bid 
prope1iies, Stafford's counsel asked "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our 
proposal?" (Am. Compl. Ex. E.) That question established that there was no final agreement at 
that time. Woody's counsel underscored that point when he responded that "it seems we are 
very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of 
issues." (Id. (emphasis added).) That statement was accompanied by a list of unresolved issues, 
which, taken together, further show that the parties had not had a meeting of the minds as to 
several material terms and therefore had not formed a valid contract about the purchase of the bid 
properties. 
C. According to the Amended Complaint, There Was a Mutual Mistake About 
the Ownership of the Outlet Property. 
Even if the parties had formed a valid contract about the "Bid Properties Purchase," 
which they did not, such a contract would not be enforceable because the Amended Complaint 
establishes that there was a mutual mistake between the parties about the ownership of the Outlet 
Property. Importantly, "[r]escission is the proper remedy where there is a mutual mistake of fact 
is material or fundamental to the contract" 0 'Connor v. Harger Const., , 1 Idaho 
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904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (Idaho 2008). That remedy "abrogates the contract and restores 
parties to their original position, as if the contract had never occurred." Id According to the 
Amended Complaint, the parties mistakenly assumed that one of the properties that Stafford 
sought to purchase-the Outlet Property-was owned by Staffwood. The Amended Complaint 
asserts that "the title company that reviewed the ownership of the Bid Properties discovered that 
Smith Chevrolet is the record title owner of the Outlet Property, which created an issue as to 
whether Staffwood or Smith Chevrolet was the owner of the Outlet Property." (Am. Compl. ~ 
27.) It is manifest that the ownership of a property is a fact that "is material or fundamental to 
the contract" to purchase such property. 0 'Connor, 145 Idaho at 909. Thus, an agreement about 
the purchase of the Bid Properties would not be enforceable in any event because it would have 
been entered based on a mutual mistake of the parties. 
II. The Parties Never Formed a "Division of Staffwood Properties" Contract. 
Stafford's claim about a "Division of Staffwood Properties" contract fails for similar 
reasons. Stafford suggests that he accepted a valid offer about the division of the Staffwood 
properties in the January 30 letter, but that suggestion falters. An acceptance, is simply not valid 
if it is not "identical with the offer and unconditional" or ifit "modif1ies] or introduce[s] any new 
tem1s into the offer," Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 ( emphasis added), and the January 30 letter ran 
afoul of those requirements. To start, it proposed various new terms for Woody's consideration. 
Some of those tenns were in an enclosed draft Addendum related to the purchase and division of 
properties. Others were outlined in the letter itself, including seven "issues," or material terms, 
that needed to be addressed for settlement. The letter also proposed that the parties sign a "third 
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Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered 
by the enclosed Addendum." (Id.) That proposal in and of itself was a material tenn to the 
parties' agreement. And the letter also reaffirmed that it was a proposal and not an acceptance of 
any contract, stating "[p ]lease let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested 
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and 
sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id ( emphasis added).) The 
January 30 letter was not an "acceptance" of a valid contract because it contained myriad 
proposals and because the division of properties was simply a part of an effort towards an all-
encompassing settlement agreement. 
Nor was a valid contract fanned afier the January 30 letter. Communications between 
the parties after that date establish that the pariies were "very close to agreement, but that 
"clarifications or decisions" were needed on a whole range of issues. (Arn. Cornpl. Ex. C.) 
Those communications establish that a "[ d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement" was 
required, (Id.), and clarify that a binding contract had not been formed. 
III. Stafford Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing Because there is No Enforceable Contract. 
Stafford contends that Woody breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, but he fails to state a claim as a matter of law. "The implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'l 
Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, I 09 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Idaho 2005) (internal quotation marks and 
omitted). But where an agreement between parties not enforceable, are no 
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obligations imposed by agreement that the parties are required to perform in good faith." Id 
Where, as here, no binding contract is formed, claim for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing cannot stand. Id (affirn1ing grant of summary judgment against claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where agreement between parties 
was not enforceable). 
IV. Stafford Fails to State a Claim for Promissory Estoppel Because that Doctrine is a 
Substitute for Consideration, Not a Substitute for a Definite Agreement. 
Stafford also raises a claim based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but that claim is 
also deficient. It is well-settled that "[p ]romissory estoppel is simply a substitute for 
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties." lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367-
68. Because of that, the "doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no consequence," where, as here, 
"[w]hat is lacking is a suniciently definite agreement." Id In other words, "[b]ecause there is 
'no complete promise ... to be enforced' here, [Stafford] is unable to avail [him]self of 
promissory estoppel." Bank <~(Commerce v . .Jejjerson Enterprises, 154 Idaho 824,835,303 P.3d 
183, 194 (Idaho 2013). Put simply, "[i]t is not for Jack of consideration that [Stafford's] claim 
fails, but rather for lack of an agreement itself" Chapin v. Linden, 114 Idaho 393, 397, 162 P.3d 
772, 776 (2007). The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no moment here and fails to cure the 
fiaws in Stafford's contract claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Stafford fails to state valid contract claims because the Amended Complaint establishes 
the parties did not form valid, enforceable contracts about the Properties 
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or division of other properties owned by Stai1wood. The parties instead were simply engaged in 
ongoing negotiations toward a final settlement agreement that was never reached. The Amended 
Complaint should accordingly be dismissed. 
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